Scandalum Magnatum: The  Scandal of Magnates  in English Law, Society, and Politics by Lassiter, John Carroll
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1974 
Scandalum Magnatum: The "Scandal of Magnates" in English 
Law, Society, and Politics 
John Carroll Lassiter 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the European History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lassiter, John Carroll, "Scandalum Magnatum: The "Scandal of Magnates" in English Law, Society, and 
Politics" (1974). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624871. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-a37y-yn51 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
SCANDALUM MAGNATUM:
u
THE "SCANDAL OF MAGNATES" IN ENGLISH LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
John C. Lassiter 
1974
ProQuest Number: 10625349
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is d e p e n d e n t  upon th e  quality of th e  copy  subm itted.
In th e  unlikely e v en t th a t th e  author did not send a  co m p le te  m anuscript 
an d  there  are  missing p ag es , th e se  will b e  no ted . Also, if m aterial h ad  to  b e  rem oved,
a  n o te  will ind icate th e  deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10625349
Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of th e  Dissertation is held by th e  Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is p ro tec ted  against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o d e
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1/ — Author
Approved, July 1971|
James N. McCord
Anthony J* Esler »
Bruce T. McCully
IX
6 05667
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . ............................. . . . . ..............   iv
INTRODUCTION . ............      2
CHAPTER I. STATUTORY ORIGINS AND EARLY INTERPRETATION ...............  3
CHAPTER II. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL DEVELOPMENTS..........................  24
CHAPTER III. SCANDALUM MAGNATUM "IN THE TIME OF OUR GREAT HEAT" . . 60
CONCLUSION  ...............     87
APPENDIX . . .  ..........     . . . 90
LAW REPORT ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . .  J .................   92
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY     . . . . . . . .  96
VITA  ...................     Ill
iii
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to trace the history of the 
statutes of scandalum magnatum from their enactment in the later middle 
ages to their repeal in 1887, with particular emphasis on the special 
legal remedy provided by the statutes exclusively for the "great men of 
the realm," for members of the English nobility whose dignity and honor 
had allegedly been absued by "scandalous words."
The origins and early interpretation of the statutes of scan­
dalum magnatum are considered in light of the few records surviving from 
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. These records 
point to the fact that the offence of scandalum magnatum was originally 
conceived as a criminal, seditious offence for which no civil remedy 
was available.
The development over the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries of a civil interpretation of the statutes of scandalum mag­
natum is considered in the context of the declining power and prestige 
of the nobility in the years preceding the Civil War. Legal records 
illustrate how the statutes served in defense of the dignity, social 
status, and political position of the nobility and were often used as 
weapons in the feuds which raged among members of the aristocracy.
While the statutes of scandalum magnatum continued in use as a 
defense of the honor, status, and reputation of noblemen in the later 
seventeenth century, after the Restoration, they increasingly came to be 
used as a political weapon as well, serving to silence citicism and 
stifle opposition in political disputes. The use of the law in this 
manner is considered in the context of the party 'warfare..surrounding, the 
Exclusion crisis, late in the reign of Charles II, when the largest num­
ber and most destructive of actions of scandalum magnatum were brought.
The destructiveness of the actions brought during those years of acute 
political instability contributed to the future reluctance of the courts 
to award large sums in damages to noblemen. As a result of this and 
other factors, the number of actions of scandalum magnatum declined 
sharply after the 1680Ts, and the statutes, soon fell out of use altogether, 
to be repealed after over a century of disuse in 1887.
The conclusions reached by this study suggest that reliance on 
the statutes of scandalum magnatum was a function primarily of the loss 
of power and prestige suffered by the nobility, and also of the politcal 
instability which plagued England, especially during the later seventeenth 
century. Once the nobility recovered from its "crisis" and adapted to its 
new role in society, and once stability came to English politics, the 
statutes were no longer needed.
Within the learned Volumes of the Laws,
Made to doe Justice in the Subjects Cause,
A Bugbear Statute stands in potent force, 
Strong, legal and destructive in its course; 
The Title Scandalum Mangatum bears,
A Privilege of Princes, Prelates, Peers,
By then enjoy'd above Three Hundred Years.
Scandalum Magnatum; or, 
Potapski's Case, 1682.
SCANDALUM MAGNATUM:
THE "SCANDAL OF MAGNATES" IN ENGLISH LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS
INTRODUCTION
Throughout English history, the law has attached varying degrees 
of importance to words, both written and spoken, as they reflected unfa­
vorably on individuals; and often, not only was the nature of the words 
themselves the concern of the law, but so was the "quality of the person 
of whom the words [were] spoken."*
The subject to be explored in the following pages— the law of 
scandalum magnatum— though only an obscure and now obsolete part of the 
multi-dimensional law of defamation, provides the foremost example of 
this concern of the law for the "quality" of the person defamed. As such, 
its claim to historical importance lies not only in its legal implications 
but also in its social and political implications, "quality" being defined 
by the law in terms of specific social and political status. Therefore, 
what might appear to be a narrow legal topic assumes a much broader scope.
The results of this investigation, it is hoped, will exemplify 
what Professor A. L. Cross so convincingly demonstrated in 1913, namely, 
the usefulness of legal materials as sources for the study of English 
history, not simply the history of the law, but a far wider range of his-
o
torical topics.-
^William Sheppard, Action Upon the Case for Slander (London,
1662), 5.
o
Arthur L. Cross, "Legal Materials as Sources for the Study of 
Modern English History," American Historical Review, XIX (July, 1914)* 
751-771.
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CHAPTER I
STATUTORY ORIGINS AND EARLY INTERPRETATION
"Disgraceful words and speeches against eminent persons have 
been grievously punished in all ages," wrote William Hudson in the first 
quarter of the seventeenth century as he attempted to account histori­
cally for the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Star Chamber in 
cases of "scandalous words against nobles.Specifically, he was con­
cerned with the offence known as scandalum magnatum, a medieval Latin 
legal expression which was coming into general use in the early seven­
teenth century to describe the "scandal of m a g n a t e s ."^ The need to 
establish a broad historical basis for dealing with this offence had 
sent Hudson and his contemporaries on a search through court records in 
an effort to locate legal precedents.. A generation earlier, the Eliza­
bethan jurist Richard Crompton had consulted the records stored in the 
Tower of London in preparation for his work L fauthoritie et jurisdiction 
des Courts (first published in 1594), and there he examined the original 
statute on which the offence was based, carefully taking note of all
^William Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber (writ­
ten c. 1620), ed. F. Hargrave, in Collectanea Juridica (London, 1792), 
II, 102.
^Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Scandalum magnatum." The 
expression began to appear in dramatic literature and poetry of the 
period: e.g., in Thomas MiddletonTs play The Phoenix (1607), II, iii, 
171; in Philip Massinger’s play The City Madam (1623), I, i, 11; and in 
John Taylor’s poem "Farewell to the Tower Bottles" (1630).
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4details, including a discrepancy which he found between the original 
wording of the statute and the wording as it appeared in print.^
This concern for the statutory origin of scandalum magnatum was 
shared by the most famous and reputedly the most learned English jurist 
of the period, Sir Edward Coke. The results of Coke/s research on the 
subject appeared in the second part of his Institutes, an exposition of 
"many ancient and other statutes," first published in 1642.^ This work 
included the first Statute of Westminster, which was enacted in 1275, 
early in the reign of King Edward I. Its thirty-fourth chapter formed 
part of the statutory basis for the crime of scandalum magnatum: "that
from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false news or 
tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander may grow 
between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm." Impris­
onment awaited the offender "until he hath brought him into the court, 
which was the first author of the tale."-*
The offences punishable by this statute, according to Coke, were 
punishable also by the law of God. The scriptural authority he cited in 
this instance included the eighth and tenth verses of the Epistle of Jude, 
a condemnation of "those that despise rulers and speake evill of those 
that be in authority," as well as those who simply "speake evill of 
those things which they know not." Exodus 22:28 likewise placed the
^Richard Crompton, L ’authoritie et Iurisdiction des Courts 
(London, 1637), 35; see also Crompton, Star Chamber Cases (London, 1630; 
reprint ed., Boston, 1881), 36.
^Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England (London, 1797), 226.
-*3 Edward I, c. 34 (Statute of Westminster the First, 1275), 
Statutes at Large, I, 53. For the full text of this statute, consult 
the appendix.
5offence under divine law, commanding that "thou shalt not raile of the 
judges nor speak evill of the ruler of the people." Citation of scrip­
tural authority was a legal device frequently employed in the days of 
the Star Chamber when there was a reluctance among lawyers and judges 
to rely upon statute law. Coke's intention here was clearly to demon­
strate the doubly serious nature of the crime: it was a transgression 
not only of the King's law, but also of God's law.
In discussing the origins of the statute, Coke cited Polydore 
Vergil's account of the reign of King Henry III (1216-1272), a time of 
"discord and scandall" which saw the outbreak of "fearfull and bloody 
warres and rebellions," aggravated by the circulation of "false bruits 
and rumors" of the sort described in the preamble of the statute. The 
events of the civil war, which culminated at Evesham in 1265 (when Simon 
de Montfort "our English Cataline" met a bloody end), demonstrated to 
the future King Edward I "the wofull effects of such false rumors and 
reports" and the need for "severe and rigorous laws" to deal with them; 
hence, according to Coke, the enactment of the statute ten years later.
Historians have generally accepted this a c c o u n t Daines Barring­
ton, writing in the eighteenth century, elaborated upon it somewhat by 
describing a ballad composed in 1265 defaming Richard King of the Romans 
(Richard, Earl of Cornwall, brother, and loyal supporter of Henry III). 
The ballad (which, to Barrington, afforded "a curious specimen of the 
liberty assumed by the good people of the land, of abusing their kings 
and princes at pleasure") was supposedly written by a supporter of Simon 
de Montfort. Coming as it did in 1265, the year of Evesham, and only
f i
See, for example, Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law 
(Baltimore, 1966), 80.
ten years before the enactment of the first Statute of Westminster, 
Barrington concluded that "it is not improbable that it might have occa­
sioned this part of the law."^ Whatever the specific occasion, it 
appears entirely logical that when Edward I prepared in 1274 to meet his 
first Parliament, he would have taken steps to pave the way for better 
relations between himself and the great barons, to prevent discord from 
again arising "between the King and his people, or the great men of the 
realm." After all, it was to the King’s advantage, especially in the 
early years of the reign, to provide for the welfare of the magnates, to 
secure their support when he most needed it and to avoid their hostility 
later in the face of rising royal power.
To depart temporarily from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
accounts of the enactment of this early law, some general observations 
need to be made about its place in medieval English legal and constitu­
tional history. The first Statute of Westminster dealt with defamation 
in a purely political context; the spreading of "false news or tales" 
was made a criminal, seditious offence, punishable in the King's courts, 
and there was no provision for the civil action which came to be asso­
ciated with the offence of scandalum magnatum in the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries. The possibility of a feudal magnate bringing a civil 
action for defamation against a particular individual in the King's 
courts did not exist in the middle ages. It is a well-known, though 
perhaps curious, fact that the King's courts did not entertain pleas of
o
defamation in medieval times. A dispute between two Irish magnates was
^Daines Barrington, Observations Upon the Statutes, 2d ed. 
(Dublin, 1768), 66.
^F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The History of English Law Before 
the Time of Edward I (Cambridge, 1911), II, 536; S. F. C. Milsom, His­
torical Foundations of the Common Law (London, 1969), 332-333.
7brought before the court at Westminster in 1295, twenty years after the 
enactment of the first Statute of Westminster, and the rule was laid 
down then that "in this realm it is not the practice to plead pleas of 
defamation in the King's Court.
This rule did not mean, however, that medieval Englishmen : had no
legal remedy for defamation at their disposal, nor did it mean that the
offence Was not taken seriously. To the contrary, defamation had long
occupied a place in English law, dating back to the Dooms of Alfred the
Great in the late ninth century, when it was enacted that "if anyone
utters a public slander . . . he shall make amends on no lighter terms
than the excision of his tongue . . . ; and the Norman Ancienne Coutume
which set fines and required acts of public humiliation as punishments
for defamation.H An element of the Roman law of defamation was also
present in England; the offence came under the general classification of
injuria. As Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century, "an injuria is
committed not only when a man is struck with a fist or flogged or beaten
with clubs but when he has been insulted or victimized by defamatory
1 9verses and the like." This Roman element was present in ecclesiastical 
law in England, and since defamation was classified as a spiritual 
offence, it fell within the jurisdiction of the church courts. Despite
^Rotuli Parliamentorum, I, 132-134, cited by T. F. T. Plucknett,
A Concise History of the Common Law, 2d ed., enl. (Rochester, New York, 
1936), 429.
^Stephen B. Baxter, ed., Basic Documents of English History 
(Boston, 1968), 6; cf. Plucknett, Concise History, 427n.
■^*~Van Vechten Veeder, "The History of the Law of Defamation," in 
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Boston, 1909), III, 449.
12Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. 
George E. Woodbine; trans. Samuel E. Thorne (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), II 
438.
a limitation placed on ecclesiastical courts in cases of defamation in 
1285 by the writ Circumspecte A g a t i s , - ^  the offence remained primarily 
within the jurisdiction of the church until the sixteenth century. It 
was only then that the common law finally came to include defamation 
clearly within its own jurisdiction.-^
Spiritual courts, however, were not the only courts which heard 
cases of defamation in the middle ages; secular manorial and other sei- 
gnorial courts also provided a legal remedy for the offence. It was to 
these local courts that most ordinary Englishmen could go when they had 
been injured by "vileynes paroules," and the records of these courts 
reveal a relatively large number of cases for s l a n d e r . S u c h  actions 
demonstrate the fact that in the middle ages, the King’s courts simply 
did not undertake to enforce the entirety of English law, and that defa­
mation was one of those areas which fell outside its j u r i s d i c t i o n . ^
With these facts in mind, the significance of the thirty-fourth chapter 
of the first Statute of Westminster becomes clearer. It defined a spe­
cial political offence, punishable in the King's courts, that was more 
serious than ordinary defamation, but not serious enough to be considered 
treason. By the fourteenth century, the offence which came to be known 
as scandalum magnatum occupied a middle ground in the range of legal
13E. B. Graves, "Circumspecte Agatis," English Historical Review, 
XLIII, 1-20.
^Milsom, Historical Foundations, 332; see also Coke’s report of 
Palmer v. Thorpe, 4 Co. Rep. 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. 909 (1583).
-^For examples in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see 
F. W. Maitland and W. P. Baildon, eds., The Court Baron (London, 1891), 
and F. W. Maitland, ed., Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial 
Courts (London, 1889).
-^Maitland and Baildon, The Court Baron, 116.
action that could be taken for words: between the remedy available to
the individual in church or local courts and the remedy available to the 
crown in actions of treason for words.
The early interpretation of the first Statute of Westminster is 
illustrated by a case which came before the Court of King's Bench in 
1279* only four years after the enactment of the statute. A charge was 
brought against one Hugh of Crepping for speaking words "in many districts" 
to the effect that "the king had universally forbidden anyone to scythe
meadows or to reap corn, and . . . that war would come in a short time."
The charge clearly matched the offence defined by the statute— the spread­
ing of false news whereby discord might arise between the King and his 
people— though Hugh convinced the court that he never spoke the words 
alleged against him in the first place and was thus found innocent of 
contriving "anything to the injury of the king and the realm."^-^ The 
wording of both the accusation and the acquittal demonstrates the sense 
in which the law was first applied. The words allegedly spoken, as they 
involved the King, were too dangerous in their implications to be con­
sidered mere slander, but, at the same time, they were not strong enough 
to amount to treason.
The concept that the great men of the realm were due special 
legal protection from "false news and tales" evolved over the century 
following the enactment of the first Statute of Westminster. In 1340,
for instance, a justice of the King’s Bench brought an action (a bill
of trespass) against a woman who had accused him of being false to the 
King and to his charge as a judge, in essence; challenging his reputation
^ Coram Rege Roll, no. 49 (Michaelmas, 1297), m. 39d., in G. 0. 
Sayles, ed., Select Cases in the Court of King’s Bench Under Edward I 
(London, 1936), I, 51.
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as administrator of the King's justice.^ Four years later, an action 
was brought against John of Northampton for the offence of scandalum 
justiciarjorum et curiae, resulting from a letter he had written claiming 
that the King's justices would do nothing more "to meet the demands of 
the king or of Philippa, the queen of England, than of anyone else in the 
k i n g d o m . T h e s e  cases reflected the growing concern of the justices 
of the King's courts for their professional reputations, both as individ­
ual judges and as members of the royal judiciary.
During the reign of King Richard !II (1377-1399), the provisions 
of the first Statute of Westminster became more clearly identified as a 
special protection for the reputation of the great men of the realm.
The first twelve years of the reign saw the enactment of two new statutes 
which reenforced the statute of 1275 and elaborated upon the offence of 
scandalum magnatum. The emphasis in these new statutes was clearly on 
the great men of the realm; the first, enacted in 1378 at Gloucester, 
enumerated those who were entitled to protection: "prelates, dukes,
earls, barons, and other nobles and great men of the realm, and also . . . 
the Chancellor, Treasurer, Clerk of the Privy Seal, Steward of the King's 
house, Justices of the one bench or of the other, and . . .other great 
officers of the realm." The purpose of the law was restated in stronger 
terms than the 1275 version, invoking the security of the kingdom itself:
18
Coram Rege Roll, no. 321 (Trinity, 1340), m. 124, cited in G. 0. 
Sayles, ed., Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench Under Edward I 
(London, 1939), HI, lxxxii.
^ Coram Rege Roll, no. 338 (Michaelmas, 1344), m. 162d, in G. 0. 
Sayles, ed., Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench Under Edward III 
(London, 1965), VI,36. This case was one of two cited by Coke in his 
discussion of libel in the third part of his Institutes, first published 
in 1644. See Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of Eng­
land (London, 1797),174.
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. .whereof great peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and 
quick subversion and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not 
provided . . .”20 fact that the 1275 statute required this elaboration
clearly suggests that the offence of scandalum magnatum had become the 
cause of some alarm among the great men of the realm. The circumstances 
surrounding the enactment of this statute reenforce this suggestion.
The 1370’s were bad times for England. The political peace of 
the preceding decade, sustained by the spoils of war with France, was 
shattered by a series of developments which would lead eventually to the 
acute disorders of the 1380’s. The deaths of Queen Philippa in 1369 and 
of Edward the Black Prince in 1376, along with the rapid personal decline 
of King Edward III, had a demoralising effect on the English court and 
severely weakened royal government. When the ten-year-old Richard II*. 
came to the throne in 1377, conditions in England had reached a low 
point, aggravated by a threat of invasion from France which lasted until 
the death of Charles V in 1380. Beneath these developments was increas­
ing discontent among the lower orders of English society, where the 
effects of the bubonic plague were still felt. A series of poll taxes 
levied in the years between 1377 and 1381 helped cause this discontent 
to erupt into violence, culminating in the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381.
These years of crisis bred the need for a scapegoat, an identi­
fiable oppressor who could be blamed and attacked for the troubles which 
beset England. One figure, among many, met the requirements for scapegoat, 
namely, John of Gaunt, the powerful Duke of Lancaster, who, in the eyes 
of many, personified the worst evils of the ruling order. The verbal
20
2 Richard II, c. 5, Statutes at Large, I, 342-343. For the full 
text of this statute, consult the appendix.
12
abuse suffered by Gaunt in these years is almost evidence enough to iden­
tify him with the enactment of the 1378 statute against the "devisors of
Ol
false news and of horrible and false lies." Barrington remarked that 
the statute was ''certainly occasioned by the defamation of John of Gaunt, 
by those who supported the lower people and villeyns against the barons," 
citing a writ entitled Pro Rege Castellae contra defamationes insurgentium 
to support his statement.^2 Gaunt himself had addressed the King and 
the Lords in Parliament in 1377 to protest against certain words which 
"had been long, though falsely, spread about the kingdom" to his discredit. 
He stoutly defended his own reputation and that of his ancestors, declar­
ing himself "ready to defend himself by his body or otherwise, as the 
king and lords should award, as if he was the poorest knight bachelor of 
the realm." He concluded his address by urging that "a good act, or 
ordinance, might be provided in this parliament and a just and speedy 
punishment assigned to all the inventors of such evil reports, for the 
preventing the danger of them for the time to come."^ This effort on 
the part of Gaunt in defense of his reputation was presumably the origin 
of the statute enacted at Gloucester in 1378.
Little evidence exists of the early application of this statute. 
Given the nature of the events which took place in the three years follow­
ing its enactment, one can reasonably assume that it was virtually useless
^W. F. Finlason, Reeves' History of the English Law, new Amer­
ican edition (Philadelphia, 1880), III, 401. See also the notes to Lord 
Cromwell's case, 4 Co. Rep. 12b, 76 Eng. Rep. 877 (1578), where the 
enactment of the statute is attributed to a quarrel between John of Gaunt 
and "W. Wickham," who had "slandered Gaunt with illigitimacy."
^Barrington, Observations, 242-243. Gaunt had assumed the title 
of King of Castile.
^Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England (London, 1806), I,
159. No source is given for this speech.
in silencing criticism against the ruling order. It certainly did not 
prevent the spread of the Peasants’ Revolt in the spring and summer of 
1381; indeed, it is difficult to conceive of this law being effectively 
enforced until after the revolt, and even then, only one example survives, 
that being an action brought in 1383 against John Cavendish, a fish­
monger, for accusing Michael de la Pole, the Lord Chancellor of England, 
of bribery.24 Whatever the case, it became necessary to enact yet another 
statute in 1388, only ten years after the one enacted at Gloucester. In 
a further attempt to get at the sources of "false news," a small but 
significant change was made in the judicial process prescribed for dealing 
with the offence: "It is accorded and agreed in this Parliament that
when any such is taken and imprisoned and cannot find him by whom the 
speech be moved, as before is said, that he be punished by the advice of 
the council, notwithstanding the said statutes.”25 By the provisions of 
this third statute of scandalum magnatum, the King’s council assumed an 
important role in dealing with the offence, a role which was to become 
the basis for the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Star Chamber in 
cases of "scandalous words against nobles" in the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries.
Historians dealing with the statutes of scandalum magnatum in 
their medieval context have often described them as examples of "class 
l e g i s l a t i o n . "26 The term implies that the statutes were enacted to
^^Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, 168-170, cited by William Holdsworth, 
A History of English Law (Boston, 1922), III, 409.
2^12 Richard II, c. 11, Statutes at Large, I, 381. For the full 
text of this statute, consult the appendix.
26por example, see Frank Carr, "The English Law of Defamation,"
Law Quarterly Review, 18 (1902), 260; and J. J. Jusserand, English Way­
faring Life in the Middle Ages, trans. L. T. Smith (New York, 1929), 276- 
279.
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further the interest and security of a particular class in society at 
the expense and to the disadvantage of another. While this interpreta­
tion may be valid, the wording of the statutes themselves does not iden­
tify any particular element of society as its target— anyone found 
guilty of spreading false news or tales could be punished— and despite 
the enumeration of those protected by the law, the interest of more than
just the ruling class was served. Theoretically, at least, the statutes
were a benefit to all society in the sense that they were designed to 
preserve public order, to prevent discord from arising "whereof great 
peril and mischief might come to all of the realm, and quick subversion 
and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not provided." To
consider this a genuine motive behind the enactment of this statute is
not at all unreasonable when one remembers how few means existed in the 
middle ages to preserve public order; and in an age when there was no 
reliably accurate source of news, and when communication was primarily 
by word of mouth, the thinking behind these statutes appeared more logical 
than it would in later times.27
The acute political instability which afflicted England period­
ically from the 1370fs until the end of the fifteenth century was severely 
aggravated by the circulation of false news and tales. The reign of 
Henry IV, for instance, was plagued by a number of rumors that the deposed 
(and now dead) Richard II was still alive and in Wales. These rumors were 
so serious that they were often dealt with as t r e a s o n . 26 An illustration
2^See Justice Atkyns* remarks in the case of Lord Townsend v. Dr. 
Hughes, 2 Mod. 161-162, 86 Eng. Rep. 1000-1001 (1677). His observations 
were made at a time when the statutes of scandalum magnatum had become 
more of a "class" weapon than ever before.
26j. g . Bellamy, The Law of Treason in the Late Middle Ages (Cam­
bridge, 1970), 116.
of the severity of the law in this respect can be found in the case of 
John Sparrowhawk, brought before the Court of King’s Bench in 1402. 
Sparrowhawk had made the fatal mistake of repeating in public certain 
things he had heard from a . tailor’s wife, who, in an angry tirade against 
the King (Henry IV), had gone so far as to blame even the bad weather on 
royal policy. She had claimed that the Earl of March was the rightful 
monarch (this was Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March, who had a strong claim 
to the throne, his family having been designated heirs by the childless 
Richard II). She also insisted that "Owain Glyn Dwr" was the legal 
Prince of Wales (this was Owen Glyndwr, one of the gentry of the 
Welsh Marches who had declared himself Prince of Wales in 1400 and led 
a revolt against Henry IV). The King, she claimed, "had not kept his 
covenant with his commons," and he "did not wish to obey the commands of 
the pope of Rome, for that reason all the bad weather for many days 
past." By repeating all this in public, Sparrowhawk found himself 
accused and convicted of "inciting and arousing the people in this matter 
against their . . .liege lord." He was sentenced to be "drawn as the 
king’s traitor from the Tower of London . . .to Tyburn and there . . . 
to be hanged and afterwards beheaded, and . . . his head, thus cut off
is to be placed upon Newgate . . . in the sight of all there passing by, 
as an example to all beholders. The severity displayed in this 
instance reflected the instability of the early Lancastrian regime.
The records of the politically tumultuous fifteenth century 
afford numerous examples of government pre-occupation with false news and 
tales, especially during the period of the Wars of the Roses. The
^ Coram Rege Roll, no. 564, m. 12 (Crown) in G. 0. Sayles, ed., 
Select Cases in the Court of King’s Bench Under Richard II, Henry IV, and
Henry V (London, 1971), 123-124.
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recurring insanity of King Henry VI gave rise to a number of cases 
involving words spoken against the King and his council. In 1450, for 
instance, two men from Sussex were indicted for saying that "the King 
was a natural fool and would oftentimes hold a staff in his hand, with 
a bird over the end, playing therewith as a fool; and that another King 
must be ordained to rule the land." In 1455, John Gayle was indicted 
for saying "rex et omnes domini sui circa personam suam, et concilium 
suum, falsi sunt." The courts under Edward IV dealt with similar cases, 
most of them arising from verbal challenges to the King's claim to the 
throne. In 1462, one Oliver Germaine was hanged, drawn and quartered
Of)
for suggesting that Edward IV was not the rightful king. u
This concern with words was by no means unfounded in the late 
fifteenth century; after all, it might be argued, the Yorkist throne 
itself was toppled by the circulation of "false tales" regarding the 
whereabouts of the two young princes (sons of Edward IV) who mysteriously 
disappeared from public view in 1483. The enemies of Richard III iden­
tified him as the murderer of the princes and exploited the rumors of 
their deaths to great advantage. Even after Bosworth, rumors continued 
to circulate about their whereabouts, now to the disadvantage of the 
usurper Henry VII who had to deal with Yorkist pretenders claiming to 
be the princes.
Government concern with words, however, was not limited only to 
politically dangerous rumors., Verses and ballads which reflected 
unfavorably upon those in power also came to be dealt with severely in
30The examples cited in this paragraph are among twenty-three 
such cases used as precedents in the trial of Hugh Pine in 1629 for speak­
ing disrespectfully of King Charles I. They all date from the late fif­
teenth century. See the Case of Hugh Pine, Esq., Cro. Car. 117-126, 79 
Eng. Rep. 703-711 (1629).
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the latter half of the fifteenth century. A favorite example of sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century legal writers was that recorded in Fabyan’s
Chronicle, concerning one William Colingbourne who in 1485 had composed
"a rime . . .in derision of the kyng and his counsaill:"
The Cat, the Rat and louel our Dogge 
Ruleth all Englande vnder a Hogge.
This seemingly harmless verse contained ill-disguised references to three
of Richard Ill’s councillors, Sir William Catesby, Sir Richard Ratcliff,
and Lord Lovell, as well as to the King himself, whose cognizance was the
white boar. For this crime, Colingbourne "was put to the most cruell
death at the Towre Hill."31 A similar example came in 1493 when Thomas
Bagnal was indicted for "publishing poems and ballads to the disgrace of
the King (Henry VII) and his council," the punishment for which was to
be hanged, drawn, and quartered.32 Sir Francis Bacon’s Historie of the
Raigne of King Henry the Seventh recounts how there "came forth swarms
and vollies of libels . . . containing bitter invectives and slanders
against the King and some of the counsel: for the contriving and dispersing
thereof (after great diligence of enquiry) five mean persons were caught
up and executed."33
From the examples cited thus far, it is clear that the offences
^Ifhe Chronicle of Fabyan (London, 1559), 519. This case was 
among those cited in Pine’s case, Cro. Car. 123, 79 Eng. Rep. 708-709 
(1629). Hudson refers to it in his Treatise as an example of "libels 
which touch the alteration of government," Collectanea Juridica, II, 100. 
Shakespeare, among others, made effective literary use of the hog image, 
derived from the King’s badge, the white boar (e.g., The Tragedy of 
Richard the Third, I, iii, 228).
32Pine’s case, Cro. Car. 124, 79 Eng. Rep. 709 (1629).
33Francis Bacon, The Historie of the Raigne of King Henry the 
Seventh (London, 1622), reprinted in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed.
James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (London, 1870; reprint ed.,
New York, 1968), 153-154.
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involving words spoken against those in power— including the offence of 
scandalum magnatum— were conceived primarily as political and therefore 
criminal offences and were frequently treated as treason when they 
involved the King and his council. For this reason, the statutes of 
scandalum magnatum can be counted among the origins of the notion of 
seditious libel, a notion which would develop more clearly during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Court of Star C h a m b e r . 34
The civil nature which the offence of scandalum magnatum was to 
acquire in the sixteenth century was absent in the middle ages. In fact, 
the first recorded civil action on the statutes of scandalum magnatum 
came in 1497, well over a century after the last of the statutes had been 
enacted.35 This gap frequently annoyed seventeenth-century lawyers in 
their attempts to justify the enormous civil suits they themselves were 
bringing on behalf of insulted noblemen. Francis Pemberton, for instance, 
arguing for the plaintiff in the case of Lord Townsend against Dr. Hughes 
in 1677, found his arguments challenged by the counsel for the defense, 
who reminded him that "upon this statute . . . there was no action brought 
until 13 Hen. 7, which was above an hundred years after the making of 
that law," implying, of course, that the plaintiff had no sound precedent 
upon which to base his action. Pemberton, however, dismissed this point 
on the grounds that "in those days the English were quite of another 
nature and genius from what they are at this time." The lengthy explana­
tion that followed was in many respects historically accurate: "The
■^Plucknett, Concise History, 431-432.
^^Lord Beauchamp v. Sir Richard Croft, Keilwey 26-29, 72 Eng. Rep. 
182-186 (1497). Holdsworth incorrectly dated this case 1569, apparently 
having mistaken James Dyer’s report of the case in that year as being 
contemporary with the case itself. See Holdsworth, History, III, 409n.
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constitution of this kingdom," observed Pemberton, "was then martial and 
given to arms; the very tenures were military . . From this, he pro­
ceeded to give "the true reason why so few actions were formerly brought 
for scandals, because when a man was injured by words, he carved out his 
own remedy by his sword." In those days, noblemen had "immediate recourse 
to their arms . . . and seldom or never used to bring any actions for 
damages . . . .and having thus made themselves judges in their own cases, 
it was reasonable that they should do themselves justice with their own 
weapons."36
The weaknesses of his own case aside, 'Pemberton1s arguments are 
historically appealing. The political anarchy of the fifteenth century 
was in large measure the result of noblemen carving out their own remedy 
by their swords. As Professor Lawrence Stone has observed, "Before the 
sixteenth century physical force had been widely dispersed among the 
nobility and gentry and had been readily used by them in pursuance of 
personal ends." Therefore, one of the major tasks facing the Tudors in 
the sixteenth century was to limit the military capacity of the nobility, 
"to pursuade the nobility themselves that resort to violence was not
07
merely illegal and impolitic but also dishonorable and morally wrong."
This was essentially the import of Pemberton’s argument: the reason
that no civil actions of scandalum magnatum were brought until 1497 was 
that prior to then, noblemen pursued "the military way of revenge to which 
they had been accustomed."38 it followed from his argument that when
^Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 154-156, 86 Eng. Rep. 997
(1677).
37Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy (Oxford, 1965),
199, 201.
■^Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2„ Mod. 156, 86 Eng. Rep. 998 (1677).
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noblemen began to abandom (or were forced to abandon) their military 
habits, only then did they become inclined to pursue their ends in less 
violent fashion. The degree to which this line of thinking furthered 
Pemberton's own case was perhaps slight, but it did provide a reasonable 
explanation for why the first civil actions of scandalum magnaturn were 
brought when they were.
For noblemen, getting into the habit of taking disputes into 
court may have been difficult, but the discovery of a set of statutes 
which offered them special legal protection from abusive language no 
doubt encouraged them in some small way to seek their revenge by means 
other than the sword, especially when there was the prospect of collecting 
substantial sums of money in damages. Lord Beauchamp (Richard, Baron 
Beauchamp of Powick) was apparently the first to make this discovery; 
it was he who, out of resentment for being brought to court by Sir Richard 
Croft on a charge of being "un forgeor de faux faits et de divers auters 
choses,11 availed himself of the remedy provided by these statutes and 
brought against his accuser the first recorded civil action of scandalum 
magnatum.39 The Court of King's Bench, composed of judges loyal to the 
Tudor regime, reacted to this action by establishing a rule which pro­
hibited even a peer of the realm from suing for words spoken in judicial 
proceedings. Citing this case, Sir Edward Coke recorded the rule in his 
Institutes; the statutes of scandalum magnatum, he wrote,
extend onely to extrajudiciall slanders, &c. And there­
fore if any man bring an appeale of murder, robbery, or 
other felony against any of the peeres or nobles of the 
realme, &c. and charge them with murder, robbery, or 
felony, albeit the charge be false, yet shall they have 
no action de. scandalis magnat' , neither at the common
■^Lord Beauchamp v. Sir Richard Croft, Keilwey 26, 72 Eng. Rep. 
182(1497:); also reported in 1569, 3 Dyer 285a, 73 Eng. Rep. 639.
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law, nor upon either of these statutes for the bringing
of his action. . .
In support of this rule, Goke quoted the maxim: lfQue home ne serra puny
pur suer des briefes en court le roy, soit il a droit ou a tort.1' Stated 
simply, "men should not be deterred to take their remedy by due course 
of law."^ John March, in his treatise on slander, referring also to 
this case, observed "for a suit or other legal prosecution in course of 
justice against a nobleman, or Great Officer, no action lies, . . . so 
that . . . there is no difference betwixt a noble man and another person.
The establishment of this rule placed a crucial limitation on 
the privilege of the nobility in early Tudor courts. Had the nobility 
secured the privilege to bring actions of scandalum magnatum against 
those who had accused them in court of various wrongs, the entire judicial 
process might have been undermined. It would have become useless for 
anyone to attempt to bring a peer of the realm to justice as long as he 
risked being sued in return for scandalum magnatum. Thus, the rule 
established in the case of Lord Beauchamp against Sir Richard Croft 
strengthened the means by which the early Tudor courts could bring the 
nobility more closely under legal control. At the same time, however, 
the case marked the first instance of a nobleman taking advantage of the 
statutes of scandalum magnatum instead of resorting to violence or other 
private, extrajudicial means to defend his reputation aggjinsJL allegedly 
scandalous words.
^Coke, 2 Institutes, 228. See also Hudson's Treatise, Collecta­
nea Juridica, II, 80; and Crompton, Star Chamber Cases, 37; cf. 2 Edward 
III, c. 11 (1328), a statute which protected a person from being charged 
with defamation in a spiritual court for a suit brought in the King's 
court.
^John March, Actions for Slaunder (London, 1647), 132.
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While Lord Beauchamp had failed, because the words were spoken 
of him in judicial proceedings, other nobles would continue to invoke 
the statutes. Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, for example, only 
a few years later found himself the defendant in a case brought by one 
John Goryng in the Court of Star Chamber. The action was brought on a 
charge of false imprisonment with intent to extort money, resulting from 
the Earl1s having seized Goryng as a ward. In response to GoryngTs bill 
of complaint, the counsel for the indignant Earl insisted that the "seid 
bill is untrew and made only to the grettist disclaunder of the seid 
Erie;1' and then reminding the court that the Earl of Northumberland was 
"oone of the Nobyl Per[c]ys of this realme," the defense urged that 
Goryng "be punysshed according to the moste honorabill lawes and statutes 
in like cases ordeyned and provyded," referring to the statutes of 
2 Richard II, c.5 and 12 Richard II, c. II.42
The "thin stream" of these cases (as Holdsworth described them) 
in the early sixteenth century represented the gradual acquiring of a 
new habit on the part of the English nobility. Indicative of this new 
habit was the powerful Duke of Buckingham— known for his twelve private 
castles and hundreds of armed retainers (and later for his attainder)—  
bringing an action of scandalum magnatum in 1512 for the words: "You
42Goryng v. Earl of Northumberland (c. 1500), in I. S. Leadam, 
ed., Select Cases Before the King's Council in the Star Chamber, 147 7- 
1509 (London, 1903), 101-102. The outcome of this case is not recorded.
The court might well have ruled in favor of the Earl, however, despite 
the rule prohibiting a suit for words spoken in judicial proceedings, 
because of another rule stating that if a peer was charged in the Star 
Chamber (or in any other court) for an offence not within the jurisdiction 
of that court, he could have an action of scandalum magnatum against the 
plaintiff, because technically it would have been an extrajudicial slander. 
See Coke, 2 Institutes, 228; cf. Sheppard, Action ’ Upon the Case, 17.
^Holdsworth, History, III, 409.
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have no more conscience than a dog." These words were held actionable
in the Court of Star*Chamber.44
So it was that noblemen now found themselves in the possession 
of a new and useful weapon with which to defend their reputations and to 
strike back at those who had insulted them. The increasing use of this 
weapon over the course of the sixteenth century was only one example of 
the "astonishing growth in litigation" described by Professor Stone:
"All the pride, obstinancy, and passion that hitherto had found expres­
sion in direct physical action was now transferred to the dusty proces­
ses of the law."4~* It was within this historical context that the set 
of medieval statutes enacted to prevent discord from arising "between 
the King and his people, or the great men of the realm," became the basis 
for a privilege which would be enjoyed by the English nobility for over 
two hundred years.
44Crompton, L'authoritie et Iurisdiction des Courts, 13; cited 
by Justice Atkyns in Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 164, 86 Eng. Rep. 
1001-1002 (1677); see also March, Actions for Slaunder, 136; and F. L. 
Holt, The Law of Libel (London, 1816), 167.
4^Stone, Crisis, 240-241.
CHAPTER II
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL DEVELOPMENTS
The origin of the Court of Star Chamber, once a subject of some 
debate, has now been clearly established by historians: "Star Chamber
was simply the king's council sitting as a court and inheriting . . .. 
the old jurisdictional authority which the council exercised on the king's 
behalf." One area of the council's jurisdictional authority which was 
inherited by the Star Chamber in the sixteenth century was that pre­
scribed by statute in 1388 to deal with persons responsible for spread­
ing "false news, lies or other such false things of the prelates, dukes, 
earls, barons," and a host of royal officials,.^ The offence of scandalum 
magnatum thus fell clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court of Star 
Chamber and remained there until the Court was abolished in 1641. Despite 
the fact that the Court frequently chose not to rely on legislation as 
the basis for its authority in certain matters, preferring instead to 
invoke the absolute power inherent in the royal prerogative (as in Bates* 
case in 1606),^ there was clear statutory basis for its authority in 
cases of scandalum magnatum, a fact easily overlooked or forgotten in the
■^ G. R. Elton, ed., The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Com­
mentary (Cambridge, 1962), 159.
^12 Richard II, c. 11 (1388), Statutes at Large, I, 381. See 
above, page 13. For the full text of this statute, consult the appendix.
o
JPlucknett, Concise History, 431.
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frequent absence of statutory citations in Star Chamber records. Richard 
Crompton's reference to the two statutes enacted in the reign of Richard 
II in his work on the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber served to remind 
his readers of this statutory authority.^
Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565, attributed the revival of the 
Court of Star Chamber, "after some intermission by negligence of time," 
to Cardinal Wolsey, Archbishop of York and Chancellor of England, an 
observation which is supported by the rapid increase of proceedings in 
the Star Chamber during Wolsey's rule, following a period of comparative 
inactivity in the earliest years of Henry VIII's reign.-* Among those 
proceedings recorded during Wolsey's time were cases involving words 
spoken against the Lord Cardinal himself, evidence that Wolsey used the 
Court as a personal weapon. In 1516, for instance, a privy councillor 
was sentenced for speaking "scandalous words" against the Lord Cardinal, 
and in 1517, a Justice of the Peace from Surrey was. likewise punished 
for "certain words" directed against him.^ From this evidence, Wolsey 
can be given much credit for the early exercise of the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Star Chamber in cases of false news and lies against "emi­
nent persons." By 1520, Star Chamber had become distinctly recognized 
as the chief court for dealing with the scandal of magnates.^
In the Star Chamber, the offence of scandalum magnatum continued
4
Crompton, Star Chamber Cases, 19, 35.
^Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1565), quoted in Elton, ed., 
Tudor Constitution, 165.
^Hudson, Treatise, Collectanea Juridica, II, 102.
^Ibid. The first such case cited by Hudson, aside from those 
involving Cardinal Wolsey, came in 1521, when "one Saye was sentenced 
for raising a false report of the lord Dacres, of South" (Thomas Fiennes, 
Lord Dacre of the South).
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to be interpreted as a criminal, seditious offence, just as it had been 
since the enactment of the first Statute of Westminster in 1275. The 
criminal nature of the offence— as opposed to the civil nature it grad­
ually acquired over the course of the sixteenth century--increased in 
scope, especially during the second half of the sixteenth century, during 
the reigns of Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth. In 1554, less than a year 
after coming to the throne, Queen Mary issued a proclamation directed 
against those who sought "devilishly to nourish dissension and to defame 
. . . noblemen and other personages of good worth, credit and fame.
This proclamation was accompanied by a statute, enacted in the same year, 
confirming and elaborating upon the first Statute of Westminster (1275) 
and the 1378 Statute of Gloucester.^ The new law gave Justices of the 
Peace in every shire and city the authority "to hear and determine the 
said offences and to put the said two statutes in execution." It was 
further enacted that protection be provided not only for the great men 
of the realm, but also to the King and Queen, such that if anyone were 
convicted for "speaking maliciously of his own imagination, any false, 
seditious, and slanderous news, saying, or tales," about the King or 
Queen, he would suffer the loss of both his ears on the pillory. If the 
source of the false, seditious, and slanderous news were other than the 
"imagination" of the offender— that is, if he were merely repeating what 
he had heard another say— he would lose only one ear on the pillory. 
Finally, if the false, seditious, and slanderous news were spread by 
"book, rhime, ballad, letter or writing," then the offender, upon convic-
^P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations 
(New Haven, Conn., 1964), II, 41-42.
^1 and 2 Philip & Mary, c. 3 (1554), Statutes at Large, II, 469. 
For the full text of this statute, consult the appendix.
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tion, would have his right hand stricken off.
Many factors suggest themselves as possible motivations behind 
the issuing of the proclamation and enactment of the statute, most 
notably those associated with Queen Mary's initial attempts to bring her 
kingdom back to the Roman Catholic faith. The return of Catholicism to 
England meant the reinstatement of Catholic prelates, the appointment of 
Catholic officials, and the creation of Catholic peers; it also meant
the marriage of the Queen to the future King of Habsburg Spain, whose
reputation as arch-defender of the Catholic Church did not endear him 
to his new subjects. These transformations within the ruling order 
were bound to generate opposition, which was quickly forthcoming with 
the outbreak of several violent insurrections (the most serious of which
was that led by Sir Thomas Wyatt in Kent). These circumstances made it
necessary for the government to enact new laws to deal with every type 
of opposition, be it violent or non-violent, written or spoken, ranging 
from heretical attacks on the church to slanderous words against the 
Queen and her nobles. The cruel punishments specified in the 1554 statute 
for dealing with slanderous and seditious news or tales demonstrated the 
seriousness with which the government viewed the offence.-*-®
Several new distinctions arose as a result of the Statute of 
1554, one of which was the delegation of authority to Justices of the 
Peace, an attempt to deal with the offence on a local level. The juris­
diction of the Star Chamber, however, was in no way affected by this 
provision. The statutes which had been re-enacted and reenforced were 
those of 1275 and 1378; the Statute of 1388, which had authorized the
-*-®For examples of the punishment of "sedyssyous words and rumors" 
during the reign of Queen Mary, see Henry Machyn, Diary, ed. John G.
Nichols (London, 1848; reprint ed ., New York, 1968), 69, 71, 150, 154, 164.
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council to deal with the offence, remained in force, leaving the juris­
diction of the Star Chamber untouched. A second distinction came with 
the addition of the word "seditious" to the law. This addition brought 
the offence of scandalum magnatum much closer to that of treason, a 
major step in the development of the law of seditious libel. Queen Mary- 
had modified the law of treason somewhat in 1553 in an attempt to return 
to the relatively mild definition established in 1352 (25 Edward III, 
Stat. 5, c. 2), though finding it necessary a year later to include 
"shameful slanders and lies" against her marriage to Philip of Spain 
and against Philip himself as treason, and in 1555 to include words spo-
1 -j
ken against the restored Catholic Church as treason.
Words spoken against the Queen herself, when they did not fall 
within the definition of treason, were dealt with under the provisions 
of the first Statute of Westminster, as re-enacted in 1554, a practice 
illustrated by Oldnoll’s case in 1558.12 This case involved a Yeoman 
of the Guard named Oldnoll, who had been indicted and convicted in the 
Court of King's Bench for "horrible and slanderous words spoken of the
Queen." Oldnoll was spared the pain of losing his ears on the pillory,
leaving the nature of the sentence in question, "whether he should be 
imprisoned and kept in prison until he should find in court him by whom 
the words were moved according to the Statute of Westminster, or accord­
ing to the statute 12 Richard 2, c. 11 . . . that he should be punished
^ 1  Mary, c. 1 (First Treason Act, 1553); 1 and 2 Philip & Mary, 
c. 10 (Second Treason Act, 1554); 1 and 2 Philip & Mary, c. 9 (1555),
cited by Elton, Tudor Constitution, 60, 69-72.
-^201dnoll's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336. See also, W. S. 
Holdsworth, "Defamation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," Law 
Quarterly Review, 40 (July, 1924), 309; cf. Crompton, L'authoritie et 
Jurisdiction des Courts, 35.
by the advice of the council." In essence, the question before the 
Court was whether punishment should be dealt out by the common law courts 
or by the Star Chamber. After deliberation, the justices ruled that 
Oldnoll should be imprisoned and fined according to the provisions of the 
first Statute of Westminster "and not according to the judgment or advice 
of the council . . . for that is when the slander touches the nobles and 
great officers." The Court held that the King or Queen was not included 
among "les hauts, ou grands homes ou nobles," and therefore the Court of 
Star Chamber had no jurisdiction in cases of words spoken against the 
monarch. This rule, which was an obvious attempt to limit the jurisdic­
tion of the Star Chamber, was not universally accepted, though Coke cited
1 Q
it in his discussion of the first Statute of Westminster. J Crompton, 
for one, did not feel bound by the rule when he wrote of this case, "it 
seemeth that the offence might have been examined in the Starre-chamber, 
and punished there as well as anywhere else."-^
Regardless of which court could claim jurisdiction in such cases, 
however, an important distinction had arisen within the scope of scan­
dalum magnatum as a criminal offence: while the King or Queen continued
to enjoy the same protection offered by the law to the great men of the 
realm, he or she now did so in a different statutory context. The courts 
had ruled that since the monarch was not one of the great men of the 
realm enumerated in the statutes of 1378 and 1388, he was protected from 
the offence only by the provisions of the first Statute of Westminster.
As a result of this distinction, at the beginning of the second half of
-*-^ Coke, 2 Institutes, 228.
-^Crompton, Star Chamber Cases, 37; L'authoritie et Iurisdiction 
des Courts, 35.
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the sixteenth century, the crime of scandalum magnatum technically had 
two definitions, one applying to the slander of the King or Queen, the 
other to the slander of the great men of the realm. By the early seven­
teenth century, however, when the expression came into general use, the 
first definition was generally ignored, making the offence literally the 
"scandal of magnates." 15
The reign of Queen Elizabeth I saw many significant developments 
in the interpretation of the laws of scandalum magnatum. The offence, 
of course, retained its criminal, seditious nature, with Elizabeth's 
government regarding it in much the same light as did her late sister's 
government. One of the first enactments of the new reign was a confirma­
tion of the penalties specified in the 1554 statute for "speaking false, 
s l a n d e r o u s  n e w s . "16 Throughout her reign., Elizabeth's government demon­
strated a concern for words which in any way might have imputed "lewd 
qualities against .her majesty,, or the nobility of the r e a l m .  "17 T h e  
severity with which her government enforced the law in this respect is 
demonstrated by the fate of John Stubbs in 1579. Stubbs had written a 
book critical of the Duke of Anjou's visit to England, denouncing his 
attempts to woo the Queen as "unmanlike" and "unprincelike." He identi­
fied the Duke as a "son of Henry the second, whose familie . . .  is 
fatal, as it were, to resist the Gospell," and he described the Duke's 
supposed intentions to marry Queen Elizabeth as those of "an imp of the 
crown ofFtaunce, to marye with the crowned nymphe of Englande." Such 
outspokenness could not go unnoticed; the government considered the work
1 r
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Scandalum magnatum."
1^1 Elizabeth, c. 6 (1558), Statutes at Large, II, 523. 
l^Hughes and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, II, 341-342.
31
as “Puritanical" (not an unfounded judgment, since Stubbs was the brother- 
in-law of Thomas Cartwright), and in an order of council to the Lord 
Mayor of London, it accused Stubbs for "verie contemptuouslie" intermed­
dling in matters of state "towchinge her Majesties person," and uttering 
certain things "to the dishonour of the Duke of Anjou, brother to the 
Frenche Kinge."-^ Stubbs was prosecuted on the Statute of 1554, and 
received the punishment there specified for writing "maliciously of his 
own imagination . . . false, seditious and slanderous news, sayings, or 
tales." On 3 November 1579, he had his right hand cut off with a 
butcher’s knife and a mallet in the market-place at Westminster.-^
The conviction and punishment of John Stubbs illustrated how the 
statutes of scandalum magnatum could be applied to matters of state 
directly involving the monarch. This side of the law remained primarily 
within the jurisdiction of the Council and the Court of Star Chamber 
where, of course, the statutory distinctions laid out in the ruling in 
Oldnoll's case were ignored, as were nearly all statutory distinctions.
So it was that words spoken against the person of the monarch continued 
to be treated with severity in the courts throughout the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth and well into the seventeenth century. By then, even though 
the offence still matched that described in the first Statute of West­
minster, it was seldom so identified nor was it referred to as scandalum
l^John Harington, Nugae Antiquae (London, 1804), I, 145, 154-155. 
Stubb’s book was The Discoveringe of a gaping gulphe, whereinto England 
is like to be sx<rallowed by another French marriage if the Lord forbid not 
the banes by lettinge her Majestie see the sin and punishment thereof.
19 Ibid., 157. An eyewitness observed that the crowd which had 
gathered in the market-place to watch remained "deeply silent . . .out 
of an horrour at this new and unwonted kind of punishment," suggesting 
perhaps that the letter of the law was seldom carried out. There was, 
however, nothing particularly unusual about this type of punishment; see 
Hudson, Treatise, Collectanea Juridica, II, 224.
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magnatum. The other side— and for the purposes of this investigation, 
the more important side— of the criminal offence of scandalum magnatum, 
the side which retained its legal, statutory identity even in the Court 
of Star Chamber, was that which directly involved the ’’great men of the 
realm.”
The definitive treatment of this side of the criminal offence of 
scandalum magnatum came in 1605 with the case De Libellis Famosis, pro­
secuted in the Court of Star Chamber by Sir Edward Coke, who was then 
Attorney General. In reporting this case, Coke set down four rules
regarding libel which provide probably the best summary of prevailing
20legal attitudes towards the offence. The first rule involved a basic 
distinction between public and private libels: ’’Every libel . . . is
made either against a private man, or against a magistrate or public 
person.” With this distinction in mind, Coke declared that both offences 
were serious, the former deserving a severe punishment because "although 
the libel be made against one, yet it incites all those of the same 
family, kindred, or society to revenge, and so tends per consequens to 
quarrels and breach of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of 
blood, and of great inconvenience.” However, the latter offence, the 
libel of a public person, is a greater offence, "for it concerns not only 
the breach of the peace, but also the scandal of government: for what
greater scandal of government can there be than to have corrupt or wicked 
magistrates to be appointed and constituted by the king to govern his 
subjects under him?" This line of reasoning continued in use throughout 
the seventeenth century, not only in criminal cases, but also later in
20
De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125-126, 77 Eng. Rep. 250-252 
(1605). See Plucknett, Concise History, 431.
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civil cases.
The second rule laid down by Coke in the case De Libellis Famosis 
was that even if a man be dead, a libel against him is still punishable, 
especially in the case of a public figure, because in committing such an 
offence, ’’the libeller traduces and slanders the government, which dies 
not." The third rule held that libel was punishable either by indictment 
in a common law court or by confession in the Court of Star Chamber, the 
punishment itself being determined by the "quality of the offence." The 
fourth and perhaps most important rule was the denial of truth as a defense 
in libel cases. Though disputed under certain circumstances, this rule
O  O
constituted a cornerstone in.the seventeenth-century law of libel.  ^ Coke
in 1605 summarized what he felt was the logic behind this rule:
It is not material whether the libel be true, or whether 
the party against whom it is made, be of good or ill fame; 
for in a settled state of government the party grieved 
ought to complain for every injury done him in an ordinary 
course of law, and not by any means to revenge himself 
either by the odious course of libelling, or otherwise . . .
Coke equated the crime of libelling with that of poisoning; both crimes
were committed in such a way as to deprive the victim of his ability to
defend himself. "Of such nature is libelling," he wrote, "for it is
secret and robs a man of his good name, which ought to be more precious
to him than his life." In typical Star-Chamber fashion, Coke cited
scriptural authority rather than statutory authority as the basis for the
four rules established in the case De Libellis Famosis: "Libelling and
calumniation," he wrote, "is an offence against the law of God." Among
the scriptural citations was the thirtieth chapter of the book of Job,
71 For example, see the arguments for the plaintiff in Lord Town­
send v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 157, 86 Eng. Rep. 998, 1002 (1677).
22Plucknett, Concise History, 433.
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with Coke observing that ’’Job, who was the mirror of patience . . . 
became quodammodo impatient when libels were made of him; and therefore 
it appears of what force they are to provoke impatience and contention." 
Finally, in completing his report of the case, Coke listed "certain 
marks by. which a libeller may be known:” (1) by an "increase of lewd­
ness;" (2) by a "decrease of money;" and (3) by a "shipwreck of conscience."^ 
Whether Coke based these criteria on the facts of the case is difficult 
to determine, but they clearly demonstrate the repute in which those who 
criticized public figures were held.
The circumstances to which Coke's rules were applied deserve a 
brief examination. The case which Coke reported as De Libellis Famosis 
Was that brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the King against 
one Lewes Pickeringe, a gentleman from Northamptonshire, "a scholer 
religiously d i s p o s e d . P i c k e r i n g e  was charged with libelling the late 
Archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, and his successor, Richard Ban­
croft , in a rhyme entitled "The lamentacion of Dickie for the deathe of 
his brother Jockie," "Dickie" referring to Bancroft and "Jockie" to Whit­
gift. The burden of the rhyme went as follows:
Jockie is deade and gone,
2And Dum Dickie is left alone.
When questioned about the verse, Pickeringe answered that he "took it 
to be no lybelle . . .beinge of a dead man," to which Coke responded 
with his second rule, asserting as well that it was a "defamacion of the
23De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125b-126a, 77 Eng. Rep. 251- 
252 (1605); cf. Coke, 2 Institutes, 226.
John Hawarde, Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata, 1593- 
1609, ed. W. P. Baildon (London, 1894), 222.
25Ibid., 223. This rhyme or "dirge" was allegedly sung by the 
"collyers of Croydon" on the occasion of Whitgift's funeral.
deade and lyving." The libel was further interpreted to be not only 
against Whitgift and his successor, but also by "implication” against the 
late Queen and King James, the former having been served by Whitgift, the 
latter having been crowned by him.
Pickeringe was charged with attempting to "stirre the people to
a desyre of reformacyon, which is not tolerable in a monarchie but in a
0 f\democracie," a statement supported by the usual scriptural citation. D 
Completing his prosecution, the Attorney General turned to address the 
Court as it was about to determine the sentence, urging those present to 
devise a punishment to suit the crime: "The psalmiste saythe those lips
shall be put to sylence that speake cruellye, disdainefullye, and dispite- 
fullye." The remainder of the proceedings against Pickeringe consisted 
of comments from those present on the Court (including Bancroft himself), 
most of whom took advantage of the opportunity to lavish praise on Arch­
bishop Whitgift and the late Queen and to denounce "the seede of schisme 
and sedition" allegedly planted by Pickeringe. The Lord Chancellor ended 
the proceedings by citing a list of examples to demonstrate how libellers 
were dealt with in various countries— the Lydians "per torturam et mortem," 
the Indians, "by drawinge bloude oute of the tonge and' eares and to be 
offered in sacrifice"— all of which made Pickeringe's punishment seem 
particuarly light: he was fined 10001,j imprisoned for a year, and made
to stand on the pillory in London, Northampton, and Croydon. The Lord 
Chancellor aptly concluded: "Now it is a lybelling t i m e . "27
26Ibid., 225. Among the scriptures cited was Ecclesiastes 10, 
containing the appropriate verse, "Curse not the king no, not in thought: 
and curse not the rich in they bedchamber: for a bird of the air shall 
carry the voice, and that which'hath wings shall tell the matter."
27Ibid., 226-229.
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The importance of Pickeringe’s case, or the case De Libellis 
Famosis as it is better known, lay in the rules it established regarding 
the defamation of public figures, dead or alive. In this respect, it 
defined the criminal side of the offence of scandalum magnatum and pro­
vided an interpretation of the law which would survive throughout the 
seventeenth century, for civil as well as criminal proceedings. Examples 
of its early application survive in Star Chamber records, both before 
and after Pickeringe’s case, which had merely confirmed and, by virtue 
of Coke’s definitive report, set down rules which were generally accepted 
by the courts. Among the examples was the case brought before the Court 
of Star Chamber in 1596 against a young soldier named Smith for ’’spread­
ing sclaunderous newes” about the Earl of Essex and Lord Admiral 
Effingham. ^  The action against Smith was laid under the statutes of 3 
Edward I (Westminster the First, c. 34) and 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, 
though Coke assured the Court that "without law the Councillors could 
punish these offences . . . at their discretion," a reminder that they 
did not have to rely on statute law. Smith’s punishment was to lose 
both ears, one upon the pillory at Westminster, the other at Windsor, and 
then to be whipped, imprisoned, and fined 20_1 ("which snowlde have bene 
farre greater but for his baseness, beinge a peasante and a boye"). A 
month later, another man received a similar sentence for calling the Lord
28Ibid., 39-40. The "sclaunderous news" allegedly spread by 
Smith was a story to the effect that the Earl of Essex had seized Lord 
Admiral Effingham "by the berde" and cAlled him a traitor in the presence 
of the Queen. The circumstances out of which this incident arose, accord­
ing to Smith’s account, resulted from a search conducted by the Earl of 
Essex of Effingham’s ship, where gunpowder barrels were found to contain 
ashes and sand rather than gunpowder. 1596 was the year when Essex and 
Effingham led ‘an attack on Cadiz and later faced a threatened Spanish 
invasion of Ireland, hardly the time for "sclaunderous newes" to be spread 
about.
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29Admiral a traitor.
More examples survive from the first few years of the reign of 
King James I. In 1604, the Star Chamber proceeded against a man named 
Fourde for speaking words against the Lord Chancellor, and, when sen­
tenced to the usual punishment (loss of ears, imprisonment and a fine), 
Fourde was reported to have taken it "grievously and impatiently," 
prompting the Court to declare: "Let all men hereby take heede how they
complayne in wordes againste any magistrate for they are gods."3^ State­
ments of that nature were becoming frequent in Star Chamber proceedings, 
as the interpretation of words against the great men of the realm became
more severe. "Trenching upon the honor of a noble gentleman" was equated
31with -trenching upon the honor of "King and State," an equation which 
provided the necessary theoretical justification for both the criminal 
and civil prosecution of offenders.
All of the cases cited thus far, however, have illustrated only 
the criminal side of the offence.of scandalum magnatum as it was defined 
primarily in the Court of Star Chamber in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. In each case, the words allegedly spoken were 
held to have political, seditious implications and thus matched the first 
statutory description of scandalum magnatum, the spreading of "false news 
or tales whereby . . . discord or slander may grow between the King and 
his people, or the great men of the realm." The same period which saw 
the development of this criminal interpretation of the offence also saw 
the formulation of a civil interpretation of the offence which made it a
29Ibid., 44-45. 30Ibid., 177.
^Samuel R. Gardiner, ed., Reports of Cases in the Courts of Star 
Chamber and High Commission (London, 1866), 20.
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tort as well as a crime. Attention is now turned to this side of the 
law.
The origin of scandalum magnatum as a civil offence can be
traced as far back as the reign of Henry VII, where at least two examples
survive of noblemen bringing actions of scandalum magnatum against those 
who had accused them in court of certain wrongdoings.32 These attempts 
were not well received by the early Tudor courts, where there existed a 
great concern for the establishment of a judicial system which could be 
relied upon to protect those who availed themselves of its services. No
man would care to risk bringing a peer of the realm to justice if he
could be sued in return for scandalum magnatum, so the courts quickly 
ruled that the statutes of scandalum magnatum applied only to extrajudi­
cial slander, "for no punishment was ever appointed for a suit in law,
O O
however it be false." While this rule was surely a deterrent to noble­
men, it did not prevent them from eventually taking full advantage of 
their new-found weapon; a small number of cases of scandalum magnatum 
can be traced through the first half of the sixteenth c e n t u r y . B y  the 
middle of the century; the civil side of the offence came to be fully 
recognized by the common law courts. Their interpretation of the law in 
this respect was based on the doctrine that where a statute defined a 
particular offence and prescribed a punishment for it, a person injured
~^See above, pages 20-22.
33i,ord Beauchamp v. Sir Richard Croft and others, 3 Dyer 285a,
73 Eng. Rep. 639 (1569); Coke, 2 Institutes, 228.
3^Among these cases were the Bishop of Winchester's case in 1510 
for words which "in respect of his place and dignity . . . were holden
actionable;" 1 Leonard 336, 74 Eng. Rep. 305; and the Duke of Buckingham's
case in 1512 for the words "you have no more conscience than a dog;" 
Crompton, L'authoritie et Iurisdiction des Courts, 13. See above, page 23.
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by the offence was entitled to a civil action and hence to damages even 
though the statute made no such provision.^5 So it was that a civil rem­
edy was extracted from the statutes of scandalum magnatum in the sixteenth 
century: the offence the statutes defined was a criminal offence and no
civil remedy was specifically provided; however, in keeping with the doc­
trine, if a nobleman was injured by words which by a stretch of the legal 
imagination could be interpreted as "horrible and false lies," he was 
entitled to a civil action on the statutes and to damages, a legal prac­
tice which would be carried to great extremes especially in the second 
half of the seventeenth century.
It was during the second half of the sixteenth century, however, 
that noblemen first took full advantage of the civil interpretation of the 
statutes of scandalum magnatum. The gradual increase in the number of 
these cases from the 1580’s onward can be attributed to many factors, 
each of which in some way reflecting the changing position of the aristoc­
racy in the social hierarchy of late Elizabethan and early Stuart England. 
The so-called "crisis" of the aristocracy has been frequently interpreted 
as a result of the Tudor policy which deprived the aristocracy of its 
military power and its capacity for violence. ^  The attempts to channel 
the energies of noblemen away from private warfare to less violent pur­
suits resulted in, among other things, an increase in litigation; dis­
putes which in earlier days would have been the occasion for open vio­
lence were now transferred to the law courts, which became the "cockpitt
-^Earl of Northampton’s Case, 12 Co. Rep. 134, 77 Eng. Rep. 1410 
(1613). See also, Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on the Law of Slander, 1st 
American ed. (New York, 1826), 148; and Plucknett, Concise History, 430.
■^J. H, Hexter, "Storm Over the Gentry," in Reappraisals in His­
tory (New York, 1961), 148; Stone, Crisis, 199-201.
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of revenge," as one contemporary described it.^ The feuds which were 
carried on among members of the nobility and gentry in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries, often still occasions for violence, now 
found their way into the courts where they were pursued with the same 
spirit of revenge and destruction as they would have been in open armed 
conflict.
A case of scandalum magnatum figured prominently in the feud 
which raged off and on in the 1590fs between Gilbert Talbot, Seventh Earl 
of Shrewsbury and Sir Thomas Stanhope, members of two prominent landed 
families who were neighbors in Nottinghamshire. The Talbot family was 
well known for its violent habits which characterized even the relation­
ships among its own members, .evidenced by the constant plotting which 
went on between the brothers Gilbert and E d w a r d . ^ 8  Their feud with the 
Stanhopes was carried to ridiculous extremes, as in 1593 when the Earl 
of Shrewsbury got together a group of men one night to pull down a weir 
belonging to Sir Thomas Stanhope and later tried to get his servants to 
destroy a wall in the Stanhope's park at Horseley and to engage Mr. John 
Stanhope in a fight, hoping to "wholly disfigure" hi m . ^
Not satisfied with merely inflicting damage on Stanhope's prop- 
perty, however, the Earl decided to take advantage of some words which had 
passed between Sir Thomas and one Francis Fletcher involving a petition
^J. Smyth, Lives of the Berkeleys (Gloucester, 1883), I, 242, 
quoted in Stone, Crisis, 240.
-^Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Talbot, Gilbert; Edmund 
Lodge, Illustrations of British History, Biography, and Manners (London, 
1791), III, 50-64 passim; Hawarde, Reportes, 13, 19.
39Historical Manuscripts Commission, Salisbury Manuscripts 
(London, 1894), V, 227, 229, 255; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1595- 
1597, IV, 48.
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which had been brought before the Privy Council concerning the destruc­
tion of the weir. With Fletcher's help, the Earl brought an enormous 
civil action of scandalum magnatum against Sir Thomas in 1595 for accusing 
him of disloyalty to the Queen, alleging damages in the sum of 20,0001.^
The only obstacle to the Earl's plans was one of his own servants 
named Nicholas Williamson who was then in prison for participating in the 
destruction of Stanhope's weir and in trouble with the government on sev­
eral other counts.41 Williamson, who must have felt abandonned by his 
master, offered to appear before the Council and testify that it was the 
Earl of Shrewsbury himself who was responsible for the destruction of trie 
weir and that Sir Thomas Stanhope was "wrongfully charged" in the action 
of scandalum magnatum. To make matters more difficult for Shrewsbury, 
Williamson claimed to possess evidence to support his testimony. His 
motivation seems to have been to pursuade the Earl to procure his pardon 
and pay him a sum of money in exchange for his silence, but the Earl did 
not go along with this and instead ordered a search of Williamson's home 
in hopes of locating the evidence himself.
In a letter to Sir Robert Cecil, Williamson offered to prove 
"that in that certificate which my lord sent to the Lords of the Council 
against Sir Thomas Stanhope touching the supposed scandalous speeches, 
he used a most dishonourable practice, whereby Sir Thomas is in justice 
to be discharged." In another letter to Cecil several weeks later,
40
Gilbert, Earl of Shrewsbury v. Sir Thomas Stanhope, Popham 67,
79 Eng. Rep. 1181.
^ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1595-1597, IV, 64-65. Coke, 
the Attorney General , noted that Williamson was a "dissembling, discon­
tented Papist," who had been previously involved in an attempt to convert 
James VI of Scotland to Roman Catholicism.
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Williamson described the "dishonourable practice" he had alluded to:
Francis Fletcher, to whom the words alleged against Stanhope were spoken,
had sent the Earl a verbatim account of their exchange, and upon receipt
of this account, the Earl "corrected" it, "leaving out the material words 
/ 0
of Sir Thomas." When the case came to trial before the Court of King's 
Bench, Justice Fennor acknowledged that the defendant, Sir Thomas Stanhope, 
"shews matter . . . which proves the words to be spoken in another sense
than the declaration imports," suggesting that Williamson's evidence may 
have been used in c o u r t . Whatever the case, the defense was upheld, 
and the Earl of Shrewsbury did not recover his 20,000^ in damages, tem­
porarily put off in his effort to ruin Sir Thomas Stanhope. The Earl of 
Lincoln, whose feud with Sir Edward Dymock was the occasion for a similar 
legal action in 1610, met with greater success than did Shrewsbury; un­
like Shrewsbury, he had the pleasure of seeing his adversary imprisoned 
and fined.^4
A factor in many ways related to the feuding habits of the 
aristocracy was the loss of prestige and respect suffered by English 
noblemen, especially at the hands of the gentry. By the early seven­
teenth century, this loss had become painfully apparent.45 Aware of 
their inability to command the respect they once enjoyed, noblemen were 
increasingly sensitive to assaults upon their honor, and often over­
reacted to the slightest of insults. Actions of scandalum magnatum brought
^Nicholas Williamson, to Sir Robert Cecil, 3 June 1595; 22 June 
1595, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Salisbury MSS, V, 230, 255.
^Shrewsbury v- Stanhope, Popham 67, 79 Eng. Rep. 1182.
^Historical Manuscripts Commission, Third Report, Alnwick Manu­
scripts (London, 1872), 57.
4-*Stone, Crisis, 747-752.
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by noblemen were frequently the result of such insults, and the proceed­
ings in these cases usually demonstrated an overriding concern for status 
and reputation on the part of the injured nobleman. The case of Lord 
Morely and Sir Henry Colte in 1608 is an example. Lord Morley (Edward 
Parker, Twelfth Baron Morley), while hunting one day in Hatfield Chase 
(Essex), encountered Sir Henry Colte, one of the local gentry and exchanged 
a few harsh words with him, "demaunding of Sir Henry Colte what he was."
To this, Colte responded that "for oughte he knewe, he might be as good 
a man as he," a comment which provoked "many ill wordes" from Lord Morley. 
Then, deciding to leave, the angry Lord bade Sir Henry "god buye, goodman 
Colte." Sir Henry, not to be outdone, replied in "greate passyon . . .
'god buye, goodman Morlye,f" only to find himself the defendant in an 
action brought by the insulted Lord Morley in the Court of Star Chamber.^
The Earl of Lincoln, whose name appears more than once as plain­
tiff in cases of scandalum magnatum, provides another example of this 
sensitivity to insulting words. In 1598, he brought an action of scandalum 
magnatum against a man named Michelborn who had accused him of forging a 
warrant and "recovered great damages by verdict" in the Court of King’s 
Bench. ^  In 1608, he brought another action of scandalum magnatum, this 
time against one Roughton for the words "My lord is a base earl, and a 
paltry lord, and keepeth none but rogues and rascals like himself." The
AfiHawarde, Reportes, 348. "Goodman" was the form of address for 
a yeoman. See Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost (New York, 1965),
38. As illustrated by this case, the Court of Star Chamber entertained 
pleas of a civil nature as well as pleas of a criminal nature. In cases 
of slander, the court not only fined the offender but also awarded dam­
ages to the plaintiff; see for example the case of the Earl of Suffolk v. 
Sir Richard Grenville (1631), in Gardiner, ed., Reports, 108. In Lord 
Morley?s case, however, the court dismissed his bill of complaint because 
it was "incerteinly laid."
^Earl of Lincoln v. Michelborn, Goulds. 116, 75 Eng. Rep. 1033
(1598).
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defendant pleaded not guilty, but the court ruled that the words "touched 
him [the Earl] in his honour and dignity; and to term him rbase lord* 
and ’paltry earl’ [sic] is matter to raise contempt betwixt him and the 
people, or the king’s indignation against him," adding that "such general 
words in the case of nobility will maintain an action, although it will 
not in case of a common person."^
The Earl of Lincoln, whose conduct among the Lincolnshire gentry 
was reputed to be that of a "great tyrant,"49 continued to avail himself 
of the protection offered by the law from insulting words. In 1610, he 
brought an action in the Court of Star Chamber against Sir Edward Dymock 
and several others "for contriving and acting a stage play . . . contain­
ing scurrilous and slanderous matter" about the Earl. The Court, ruling 
in favor of the Earl, sentenced those who had participated in the play 
to be imprisoned, pilloried, fined, and whipped; they were also required 
to "acknowledge their offences, and ask God and the Earl forgiveness."
Sir Edward Dymock, "who was privy and consenting to the offences," was 
himself imprisoned and fined lOOO^L.
Cases such as the ones just cited involving the Earl of Lincoln 
illustrate a paradox which was becoming more and more pronounced in 
English society in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
^Earl of Lincoln v. Roughton, Cro. Jac. 196, 79 Eng. Rep. 171.
The definition of the offence given here remained the accepted definition 
throughout the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century: cf. 
March, Actions for Slaunder, 135; Sheppard, Action Upon the Case, 17; and 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1768; 
reprint ed., New York, 1966), III, 123.
49q . E. Cokayne, The Complete Peerage, new ed., rev., enl. (London, 
1929), VII, 694. These references are to Henry Fiennes, Second Earl of 
Lincoln. For further examples of his behavior, see Stone, Crisis, 224-225.
^Oibid.; Historical Manuscripts Commission, Third Report, Alnwick 
MSS., 57. Hudson, Treatise, Collectanea Juridica, II, 101.
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Henry Peacham might well have compared the nobleman to the lion, king of 
beasts, or to the "noble orbs of greatest influence . . .raised aloft" 
among the heavenly bodies,53- but to those beneath him in the social hier­
archy, the nobleman was often regarded in just the opposite terms: he
was the "base earl" or "paltry lord" who provided suitable subject matter 
for scurrilous plays staged by local buffoons. Abusing noblemen had 
become something of a pastime for many Englishmen;: one is reminded of
Sir John Harington, casually resolving one day to write "a damnable story 
and put it in goodlie verse aboute Lord A— ," explaining that "he hath 
done me some ill t u r n e s ; " 5 2  or of John Manningham's tailor, who, upon 
being rebuked by the Lord Chamberlain for cursing the Earl of Leicester, 
told his Lordship "yf he should committ every one to prison that spake 
evil of Leister or himselfe, he should make as many prisons in London as 
there be dwelling p l a c e s . "53 Noblemen were frequent targets for verbal 
abuse, and, now unable to respond with a show of force, their only effec­
tive recourse was to the law.
Not all civil actions of scandalum magnatum, however, were the 
result of mere personal insults. Some of the earliest cases, for instance, 
arose in response to words regarding the political or religious activities 
of noblemen. In 1578, Henry, Baron Cromwell brought an action of scandalum 
magnatum against Edward Denny, the Vicar of Northlingham in the county of 
Norfolk, for accusing him of liking people "that maintain sedition against
“^ Henry Peacham, The Complete Gentleman (1634), ed. V. B. Heltzel 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), 11.
J o h n  Harington, "Breefe Notes and Remembraunces," Nugae Antiquae, 
I, 167. "Lord A— " was probably a reference to Lord Arundel. The entry 
was dated 14 June 1594.
53john Manningham, Diary, ed. John Bruce (London, 1868), 136-137.
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the Queen's proceedings." These words came in a lively dispute between 
Lord Cromwell and the vicar over two preachers whom Cromwell had invited 
to preach in the church at Northlingham. In their sermons, these preachers, 
who were obviously Puritans, "inveighed against the Book of Common Prayer 
. . . and affirmed it to be superstitious and impious." Denny, a good
Anglican, was enraged by this attack and attempted forcibly to prevent 
them from continuing, insisting that they had no licence and were not 
authorized to preach in his church. Lord Cromwell, in return, encouraged 
the two to go on, dismissing Denny's protests and saying to him, "Thou 
art a false varlet, and I like not of thee.” This remark provoked the 
words for which the vicar was charged in court: "It is no marvel you
like not of me," he said, "for you like these that maintain sedition 
against the Queen's proceedings," referring to the two preachers who had 
attacked that "which was established by the Queen and the whole Parliament 
in the first year of her r e i g n . "54
It was Edward Denny's good fortune that a young lawyer from the 
Inner Temple named Edward Coke agreed to represent him in the Court of 
King's Bench. Coke, who recorded the case years later, noted in his 
Reports that "this was the first cause that the author of this book . . .
moved in the King's B e n c h . "55 After bringing a series of legal technical­
ities to the attention of the Court— including the familiar "misrecital 
of statute"— Coke succeeded first in having the case thrown out of court, 
and again, after Lord Cromwell had brought another action, in winning a
■^Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co, Rep. 13b, 76 Eng. Rep. 881 (1578); 
see March, Actions for Slaunder, 17.
55;Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 14a, 76 Eng. Rep. 883 (1578); 
see also, C. W. Johnson, The Life of Sir Edward Coke (London, 1845), I,
29; and Catherine D. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne (Boston, 1956), 69-71.
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decision for the defendant, this time on the grounds that he was justi­
fied in speaking the words alleged against him. In a self-congratulatory 
tone, Coke explained how he managed so difficult a manoeuvre; he had 
pursuaded the Court to consider the context of the words:
. . .the defendant’s counsel have well done to shew the 
special matter by which the sense of this word "sedition" 
appears upon the coherence of all the words, that it was 
in the defendant’s meaning, the said seditious doctrine 
against the Queen's proceedings, scil. the said Act of 
Parliament de anno primo, by which the Book of Common 
Prayer was established, and that he did not mean any such 
public or violent sedition as has been described (by the 
plaintiff), and as ex vi termini per se the word itself
imports.5°
Coke was arguing against what he considered to be the strict grammatical 
construction placed on words which had been "taken by parcels against the 
manifest intent" of the defendant (a similar line of argument to that 
which saved Sir Thomas Stanhope from having to pay 20,0001 to the Earl 
of Shrewsbury in 1595). Unfortunately for future defendants in cases of 
scandalum magnatum, Coke's successful defense did not set a precedent.
Very few examples survive of a court accepting any attempt to justify 
words by the context in which they were spoken. Perhaps ironically, in 
light of his successful role as counsel for the defense in Lord Cromwell's 
case, Coke was in some ways responsible for the increasing number of 
actions of scandalum magnatum brought in the early years of the seventeenth 
century, over two decades after his first experience in the Court of King's 
Bench. William Hudson directly attributed the frequency of these cases 
in the Court of Star Chamber around 1600 to the fact that Coke was then 
the Queen's Attorney G e n e r a l . 57 Also, as described above, he played a
56;Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 14a, 76 Eng. Rep. 883 (1578); cf. 
March, Actions for Slaunder, 109-110.
5^Hudson, Treatise, Collectanea Juridica, II, 100.
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prominent role in the prosecution of Lewes Pickeringe in the case De 
Libellis Famosis (1605), and it was he who unearthed dubious medieval 
precendents for extracting a civil remedy from the statutes of scandalum
C O
magnatum in 1613.
As Lord Cromwell's case amply demonstrated, religion could be a 
touchy subject, especially when it carried political implications as it 
often did. Not surprisingly, Bishops as well as noblemen availed them­
selves of the remedy provided by the civil interpretation of the stat­
utes of scandalum magnatum. In 1562, for instance, the Bishop of Win­
chester brought an action for words implying that he was "a covetous and
59malitious bishop.” In 1582, the Bishop of Norwich brought an action 
against a man named Pricket for claiming to have in his possession a 
letter written by the Bishop which was "against the word of. God, against 
the Queen's authority, and to the maintenance of superstition." In 
this case, the Court ruled that to charge a Bishop with heterodoxy in 
religion was actionable and awarded him 500 marks in damages.50 Along 
similar lines, peers whose religious leanings aroused criticism could 
make use of the statutes of scandalum magnatum, as did the Earl of North­
ampton, a member of the Catholic Howard family, in 1613. The Earl, who
58
Earl of Northampton's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 134, 77 Eng. Rep. 1410 
(1613). The accuracy of this report was doubted in the case of M'Pherson 
v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 271, 109 Eng. Rep. 451ff (1829).
5^In reporting this case, Sir Francis Moore wrote that "1'opinion 
des Justices en Bank le Roy fuit que les parols ne fuer sufficient pur 
maintainer l'accon," Moore 38, 72 Eng. Rep. 425. Thomas Hetley, in 1628, 
included an almost identical case, Bishop of Winchester v. Markham, in 
his collection of cases in Common Pleas, noting that there the words 
"covetous and malicious Bishop" were held to be "sufficient to maintain 
the action," Hetley 55, 124 Eng. Rep. 338-339 (1628).
^^The Bishop of Norwich v. Pricket, Cro. Eliz. 2, 78 Eng. Rep. 
268 (1582).
held among other high positions that of Lord Guardian of the Cinque Ports, 
found himself the object of "divers false and horrible scandals," to the 
effect that "more Jesuits, Papists, &c. have come into England since the 
Earl of Northampton was Guardian of the Cinque-Ports, than before." An 
action was brought in the Court of Star Chamber for these words where 
those responsible for them were fined and imprisoned.^
Each of the cases cited above, whether brought before the Court
of Star Chamber or before a common law court, illustrated the political
and social importance placed by the law on words which in any way "touched
the highest bloud in the kingdome," as the Bishop of Winchester described
69those spoken against the Earl of Suffolk in 1631. The interpretation 
of the offence of scandalum magnatum, both criminal and civil, which 
evolved over the fifty years from Queen Mary's reenforcement of the orig­
inal statutes to the case De Libellis Fampsis, proved to be an important 
part of the foundation of the modern law of defamation. The severity of 
this interpretation, evidenced by the courts' adherence to a number of 
harsh rules, lent special force to the Earl of Northampton's contention 
that "dishonerable sciaundering of great personages . . . was a verye 
greate offence and worthye of great p u n i s h m e n t e . " ^ 3  I t  was a part of 
that trend taking place in English society in late Tudor and early Stuart 
times which saw noblemen, now deprived of their former military capacity 
and rapidly losing-the respect of their social inferiors, taking their 
battles to court. There they conducted their feuds with the gentry and 
defended their reputations from the disrespectful; and there they joined
^Earl of Northampton's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 132-134, 77 Eng. Rep. 
1407 (1613); see also, T. Payne•Collier, ed., The Egerton Papers (London, 
1840), 456-457. The offenders were later discharged.
69 / o
Gardiner, ed., Reports, 108. 0JHawarde, Reportes, 208.
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with Church and Crown to defend the entire hierarchy, of which they were 
so prominent a part, from verbal abuse.
It is well-known that verbal abuse often provoked challenges to 
duels in Tudor and Stuart times. Where noblemen were involved, the law 
of scandalum magnatum therefore assumed yet another function, as a legal 
alternative to the duel. The decline in aristocratic violence during the 
sixteenth century, while it signalled an end to large-scale private war­
fare among the nobility and gentry, did not mean the end of duelling as 
an accepted method of settling disputes and avenging verbal assaults upon 
a man's honor. The first two decades of the seventeenth century wit­
nessed an increase in duelling which alarmed many contemporaries. "Though 
there be in shew a settled peace in these parts of the world," wrote John 
Chamberlain in 1613, "yet many private quarrels among great men prognos­
ticate troubled humours, which may breed dangerous diseases, if they be 
not purged and prevented. King James I, who shared Chamberlain's fears, 
took a personal interest in the prevention of duels and in 1614 issued 
two proclamations for that purpose.^ It is not surprising to find the 
King, in his determination to be Rex pacificus, personally attending the 
Court of Star Chamber "to give sentence himself" against two gentlemen 
convicted there for duelling in 1617.
The success of the King's policy against duelling, however, 
would depend on more than grandly worded proclamations and royal visits
64
John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, 9 September 1613, 
quoted in Bacon, Works, XI, 396.
Proclamation against Private Challenges and Combats (London, 
1614); His Majesty's Edict Against Private Combats (London, 1614), cited 
by G. P. Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 257.
^ C a l e n d a r  0f state Papers, Domestic, 1611-1618, 436.
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to the Star Chamber. Ultimately, it would depend on the government’s 
ability to persuade injured parties to adopt "some other course rather 
than a duel for the satisfaction of honour."^7 In an age when men pro­
fessed to value their honor higher than their lives, no law would likely 
stand in the way of duelling as long as that practice remained the 
accepted means of avenging an assault upon one’s honor. Thomas Hobbes 
stated the problem concisely when he wrote that "private duels are, and 
always will be honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall 
be honour ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make 
t h e  c h a l l e n g e . " 6 8  Sir Francis Bacon, who, as the King’s Attorney Gen­
eral, led the campaign against duelling in the Court of Star Chamber, 
also recognized the dilemma the government faced in dealing with this 
"mischief that groweth every day." Since he felt that the offence "hath 
vogue only amongst noble persons, or persons of quality," he argued that 
"men of birth and quality will leave the practice, when it begins to be 
vilified, and come so low as to barbers surgeons and butchers, and such 
base mechanical p e r s o n s . "69
In Bacon’s mind, much of the problem was the result of a widely- 
held misconception "that the law hath not provided sufficient punishment 
and reparation for contumely of words, as the Lie, and the like."7^ In 
1616, he attempted to correct this misconception during the prosecution
f\ 7
Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1619-1623, 436.
^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651) in Hobbes, English Works, 
ed. William Molesworth (London, 1839), III, 81.
6^The Charge of Sir Francis Bacon, Knight, his Majesties At tour­
ney Generali, touching Duells . . . (London, 1614), reprinted in Bacon, 
Works, XI, 399.
70Ibid., 403.
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of the case of Lord Darcy against Gervase Markham in the Court of Star
Chamber. Markham was charged with a "libel, slanderous and defamatory
to my Lord Darcy," which allegedly amounted to a challenge to a duel or
71at least strong provocation. Rather than accepting this challenge,
however, Lord Darcy brought the matter before the Court of Star Chamber 
where he received the Attorney General’s praise "for taking the right 
course."^ Noting that Darcy was a peer of the realm, Bacon expressed 
his pleasure "that they that are highest in place are first in obedience 
to the law," though, from his legal experience, he must have known this 
was not always the case. Bacon took this opportunity to describe the 
course of legal action open to a peer of the realm in cases of words 
injurious to his honor, namely that "he may bring his scandalum magnatum 
and may justify.
The extent to which noblemen were inclined to follow Bacon’s 
advice was limited, judging from the number of duels which were still 
being fought in defiance of the King’s proclamations and the Privy Coun­
cil’s admonition to noblemen "to try out theyre controversies by warres 
in Westminster Hall."74 Nevertheless, some progress was made during the 
early decades of the seventeenth century, and, in the words of Professor 
Stone, "the worst evils of the duel were effectively contained in England
^Lord Darcy of the North v. Gervase Markham, Hobart 121, 80 Eng. 
Rep. 270 (1616).
7 )Notes of the Lord Darcy’s Case of Duells against Mr. Gervice 
Markham (In Camera Stellata, 27 November 1616), reprinted in Bacon, Works, 
XIII, 108.
73Ibid., 111.
74Quoted by Stone, Crisis, 248. For examples of duels involving 
noblemen in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, see Chamber­
lain’s letter to Carleton, op. cit. See also The Egerton Papers, 463.
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and never reached the proportions they achieved in France."7-* This
containment was effected through the government’s determined policy of
intervention in disputes whenever possible, a policy illustrated by an
order of the council in 1623 to prevent the Earl of Warwick and Lord
7 fiCavendish from leaving England to fight a duel, ° or the order sent to
Lord Mordaunt in 1626 commanding him not to accept a challenge from Sir
Edward Stradling.77
Though not all noblemen injured in their honor followed Bacon’s
advise to bring their actions of scandalum magnatum, many did turn to
the available legal channels to defend their honor as alternatives to
duelling. The Court of Star Chamber, for one, dealt harshly with those
responsible for challenging a nobleman to a duel, as in 1634 when Peter
Apsley was fined 500(11 for "high insolency in challenging the Earl of 
78Northumberland." Likewise, the Earl Marshal’s Court, a "court of 
honour" revived in the reign of James I, dealt frequently with "scandal­
ous words provocative of a duel."79 The surviving records of the Earl 
Marshal's Court suggest that the bulk of the cases brought before it 
involved duelling, though all types of insulting words and breaches of 
honor were dealt with there as well.^ The Earl Marshal's Court, a pre­
rogative court like the Star Chamber, came under severe criticism, 
especially from common lawyers, for having extended its jurisdiction beyond
^Stone, Crisis, 249.
^ C a l e n d a r  pf state Papers, Domestic, 1623-1625, 21, 23.
77Ibid., 1625-1626, 366,
7^Ibid., 1633-1634, 442; Stone, Crisis, 249.
79G. D. Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry (Oxford, 1959), 57.
80Ibid., 37, 57.
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the bounds of the common l a w . 81 Edward Hyde, who was largely responsible 
for the suppression of this court, described it as being "without colour 
or shadow of law, which took upon it to fine and imprison the king's 
subjects, and to give great damages for matters which the law gave no 
damages." In essence, this "upstart court," as Hyde contemptuously 
called it, created a double standard— one of honor as opposed to one of 
law.82
It was to the Earl Marshal's Court that noblemen could bring 
their complaints of scandalous words, though as in the Star Chamber, 
statutory authority for such action did not need to be invoked. In 1640, 
when Parliament was considering the suppression of the Earl Marshal's 
Court, Hyde observed that in two days, more damages had been awarded 
there "for contumelious and reproachful words, of which the law took no 
notice . . .than had been given by all the juries, in all the courts in 
Westminster Hall, in the whole term. . .”83 jje cited an amusing, if
inaccurate, example of how the court had misused its jurisdiction: a
"citizen" had mistaken the swan depicted on the crest of an earl for a 
goose, and had told a servant wearing the earl's crest to "be gone with 
his goose," for which words this "citizen" was hauled before the Earl 
Marshal's Court, and after a "long and chargeable attendance," was "for 
the opprobrious dishonouring the earl's crest, by calling the swan a
^ C a l e n d a r  of State Papers, Domestic, 1619-1623, 321.
82Edward Hyde, The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon (Oxford,
1827), I, 81, 85; cited by Squibb, High Court, 63; see also Stone, Crisis,
249.
o o
-'Hyde, Life, I, 85. Hyde's contention that the law took no 
notice of such "contumelious and reproachful words" was to ignore the 
civil interpretation of the statutes of scandalum magnatum which had 
evolved in the common law courts during the late sixteenth century, though 
in the 1630's and 1640's, the statutes themselves were seldom if ever 
invoked in a civil action.
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goose, fined and imprisoned, till he had paid considerable damages to 
the lord . . ."84
Throughout the 1620*s and 1630Vs, English noblemen resorted to 
special legal avenues such as that provided by the Earl Marshal's Court, 
not only for words provocative of a duel but for any scandalous words 
which reflected upon their honor. The House of Lords, in its judicial 
capacity, was the forum for some of these actions. In 1626, three men 
were brought before the House for arresting a servant of Lord Mordaunt 
and for "giving contemptible speeches of the said Lord Mordaunt . . .  in 
derogation of the privileges of parliament."8  ^ In 1628, the Earl of 
Huntingdon complained to the Lords that Sir Henry Sherley had raised a 
scandal against him, for which Sherley was ordered to appear at the bar 
of the House, "to give the Earl of Huntingdon . . . satisfaction for his
reparation in honour," and later was censured and committed to the 
Fleet.88 Similar examples exist in the Lord's journals dating from the 
year 1628, the last full year before the eleven-year period of personal 
rule: one Nicholas Bowyer, for instance, was ordered to be brought to
the bar "to answer his scandal of the Earl of North[amp]ton." Appearing
84Hyde, Life, I, 81. Squibb identifies this case as that of the 
Earl of Dover v. Fox (1638) and cites circumstances which cast a different 
light on the proceedings: the "citizen " had allegedly said to the earl's
servant, "Thou fellowe with the goose on thy,, sleeve, whose foole's coate 
doest thou wear?" When the servant replied it was the Earl of Dover's, 
the citizen said it was a fool's coat and a knave's coat, which were 
reflections on the earl, not simply his crest, as Hyde had contended. 
Squibb, High Court, 64. This offence as it is described in the records 
of the Earl Marshal's Court would have matched the civil definition of 
scandalum magnatum accepted in the courts during the seventeenth century.
88Journals of the House of Lords, III, 535.
88Ibid., 822-823; 842; 849. Sherley had allegedly said that the 
Earl "had oppressed the country, by levying of 11001^ or more under colour 
of his Majesty's service," and "many other words of asperity and scandal."
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shortly thereafter, Bowyer acknowledged his "hearty sorrow for this 
great offence," and asked the "forgiveness of the Lords in general for 
scandaling a Noble Peer of this Realm.” ^7 Later that year, Viscount 
Saye and Sele complained to the Lords of the "insolent and opprobrious 
speeches" of one Henry Reynd, and later, after the Lords had taken action 
against Reynd, he gave thanks to the Lords "for the sense they had of 
his honour, and their noble zeal in the preservation of it."®^
Once Parliament had been dissolved, the Lords took their cases 
to other courts. In 1629, Viscount Saye and Sele, well-known for his 
Puritan leanings and his role in the country opposition,^9 brought an 
action of scandalum magnatum in the Court of King’s Bench against a man 
named Stephens who had called him a t r a i t o r . T h e  words were spoken 
by Stephens to a servant of the Viscount, "in the presence and hearing 
of divers Of the King’s subjects," and were held actionable despite a 
plea of not guilty and motions to arrest judgment, first on the grounds 
of misrecital (for which Lord Cromwell’s case of 1578 was cited), and 
again on the grounds that the title of Viscount did not exist at the 
time of the enactments of the statutes of scandalum magnatum. The court 
dismissed both objections, observing with respect to the latter that as 
long as the plaintiff was a Viscount at the time the words were spoken,
87Ibid., 827, 830.
^Ibid., 836, 845, 851, 855. Reynd was sentenced for this 
offence in the Court of Star Chamber.
^ Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Fiennes, William, Viscount 
Saye and Sele; see also, Perez Zagorin, The Court and the Country (London, 
1969), 93.
^William Viscount Say and Seal v. Stephens, Cro. Car. 135, 79 
Eng. Rep. 719; Ley 82, 80 Eng. Rep. 646; Palmer 565, 81 Eng. Rep. 1222 
(1629).
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they were to be held actionable under the statutes.^ In giving judg­
ment for the plaintiff, the Court awarded him 200(11 in damages.
Similar actions were brought in the C o u r t  of Star Chamber, as in
1637, when the Earl of Marlborough sued Thomas Bennet for claiming to be
as good a gentlemen as the Earl and for insisting that the Bennets were
as good as the Leys (the Marlborough family) and for haying "taxed the
Earl with baseness and base d e a l i n g . I n  1638, Lord Sherard brought
an action in the Court of Star Chamber against Sir Henry Mynne for calling
him a "base lord" and a "base fellow" and for saying he would "pluck the 
feathers off the proud peacock's tail," referring to the crest of the
recently-created (1627) Sherard barony. For these insulting remarks,
Sir Henry was fined 150(11. ^
The cases cited above provide ample support for Bacon's conten­
tion that there existed among English noblemen a "false and erroneous 
imagination of honour and credit . . . . a  kind of satanical illusion
and apparition of honour."^ Professor Akrigg observes of the Jacobean 
period that "concern for honour was obsessive and irrational." The clas­
sical notion of honor as a product of virtue and virtue alone was far 
overshadowed by family pride, by the "fiction of noble blood." Citing 
the example of Viscount Montague, who ordered his Clerk of the Kitchen 
to see that no servant "insulted his lordship by turning his back upon
^Ibid. , Cro. Car. 136, 79 Eng. Rep. 719-720 (1629); cf. Bacon, 
Maxims of the Law (1630), regula viii, reprinted in Works, VII, 349.
Q 2■Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1637, 472.
93 Ibid., 1637-1638, 241; G. E. Cokayne, Complete Peerage, XI,
673; J. Bernard Burke, The General Armory of England, Scotland, Ireland 
and Wales (London, 1884), 921.
^Bacon, Charge . . . touching Duells , in Works, XI, 401.
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the joint being roasted for his table,1' Professor Akrigg states that 
"Beneath the gleaming cloak of 'Honour1 lay the naked realities of ego­
tism, irrational and provocative, anti-social and c o r r o s i v e . T h i s  
judgment is well supported by the evidence which exists in court records 
involving legal actions taken by noblemen for allegedly scandalous words, 
whether provocative of a duel or merely derogatory of their honor. As
Hobbes observed of his contemporaries, "most men would rather lose their
Q f ilives . . . than suffer slander."
The pre-occupation with honor and reputation which characterized 
the behavior of many noblemen in the years preceding the Civil War would 
continue to be justified in the eyes of the law throughout the seven­
teenth century. Even during the interregnum, after the House of Lords 
itself had been abolished along with the various privileges, attending 
membership in that b o d y , n o b l e m e n  could still invoke special legal 
protection from scandalous words. In 1657, for instance, Robert (Sydney) 
Earl of Leicester brought a successful action of scandalum magnatum 
against a parson named Mandy who had denounced him from the pulpit as 
"a wicked and cruel man and an enemy to the Reformation in England.
The counsel for the plaintiff argued that "my Lord of Leister as he is 
a noble man of this realm is . . . capable of enjoying the benefit of
95
Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant, 248-250.
96Hobbes, Philosophical Elements of a True Citizen, in English 
Works, II, 38, cited by Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's 
Political Thought," in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C, Brown (Cambridge, Mass., 
1965), 190.
^ An Act for Abolishing the House of Peers (1649), reprinted in 
Baxter, Basic Documents, 132,
^Lord of Leicester v. Mandy, 2 Sid, 21, 82 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1657).
59
the statute of 2 R. 2. notwithstanding the late Act against the House
of Lords.” In giving judgment for the plaitiff, the Court affirmed this
argument and awarded the Earl 500JL. This figure prompted the counsel
for the defense to wonder aloud "how it is that noble, men are so greedy
of damages degenerating so much from the excellencies of their ancestors,
whose aim have been only by way of indictment to repair their honours,
99not to improve their purses." This observation anticipated the reac­
tion which would be generated over the next thirty years by the increas­
ing tendency of the courts to award enormous sums in damages to noblemen 
whose honor and dignity had allegedly been traduced by scandalous words. 
The restoration of the House of Lords in 1660 signalled the beginning 
of a period during which the English peerage could count statutory pro­
tection from scandalum magnatum among its greatest privileges and most 
destructive political weapons.
"ibid., 2 Sid. 30-32, 82 Eng. Rep. 1239 (1657).
CHAPTER III
SCANDALUM MAGNATUM "IN THE TIME OF OUR GREAT HEAT"
The restoration of the House of Lords in 1660 was, by all appear­
ances, an unchallenged return to the old social and political hierarchy 
which accepted the privileged status of the peerage as a fundamental part 
of the natural order of things. The mainstream of political thought 
still assigned the nobility a legally elevated position in society, "to 
enjoy certain Priviledges, Titles, Dignities, Honours, &c. above the 
common people, to be placed in a higher orb, and to be a Skreen between 
the King and the Inferiour Subjects. . . It was held as a basic
assumption that "English nobles, being adorned with their own virtues as 
well as those of their ancestors, merit esteem, preferment, trust, 
honour, and fame above all others that would stand in competition with 
them."2 The reality which faced the peers as they returned in 1660 to 
their traditional places of power, however, was decidedly less exalted 
than the picture painted by their apologists in their own and later 
generations 1 The revolutionary experiences of the preceding decades had 
seriously undermined Englishmen’s habits of obedience, acceptance, and
■^Edward Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia; or, the Present State of 
England Compleat, 17th ed. (London, 1692), 216.
^A Vindication of the Rights and Prerogatives of the House of 
Lords (1701), quoted in A. S. Turberville, The House of Lords in the Reign 
of William III (Oxford, 1913; reprint ed., Westport, Conn., 1970), 231.
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respect which had for so long sustained the nobility in its "higher orb." 
The behavior of noblemen, still characterized after 1660 as before by 
pride and arrogance, was now accepted less and criticized more by their 
social inferiors. Almost from the moment of their return to power, the 
peers were on the defensive.
Evidence of this defensive posture was the increasing punctil­
iousness of the restored peerage, their overbearing concern for the 
formal signs of respect, and their insistence on fully exercising their 
privileges.^ in 1666, Lord Clarendon warned his fellow peers against 
"over-captious insisting upon privilege . . . either when in truth there 
was not a just ground for it, or when they would extend it further than 
it would regularly reach;" likewise, he spoke against "all unjust or 
unnecessary pretences to privileges which were not their due,"-* but it 
was all to no avail. The restored peers were determined to defend their 
traditional place in the hierarchy, and to use every available weapon 
to carry out that defense.
One of the most conspicuous examples of the defensive temperament 
of the restored lords was their sensitivity to insulting or "scandalous" 
words and the courses which were adopted to deal with the individuals 
responsible for speaking or writing them. The journals of the House of 
Lords provide numerous examples resembling the actions of their pre- 
civil war ancestors. For instance, on 30 June 1660, little more than a 
month after Charles XI’s triumphant return to England, an attorney named
^M. P. Schoenfeld, The Restored House of Lords (The Hague, 1967),
90.
^A. S. Turberville, "The House of Lords Under Charles IX," English 
Historical Review, 45 (1930), 75.
5Hyde, Life, III, 168-169.
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Alexander Peper was attached "as a delinquent" for speaking scandalous 
words of the Earl of Suffolk. Peper had allegedly referred to the Earl 
as a "fool and a knave" and a "base stinking fellow," and to add to the 
insult, when he was brought before the House to answer the charge against 
him, he told the Lords that "the Earl of Suffolke shewed himself so." 
Fortunately for Peper, the Act of Oblivion secured his pardon, but never­
theless , he was solemnly condemned for his scandalous speeches and 
threatened with a civil suit, the Lords having "left the Earl of Suffolke
/r
at liberty to take his course at law against him."°
Similar examples dating from the early years of the reign of 
Charles II include the Earl of Oxford’s complaint in 1663 that one of 
his servants had been arrested by an under-sheriff of Nottingham, who 
upon learning the identity of the man in his custody, allegedly declared 
that he "valued the Lord of Oxon’s Protection no more than the straw at 
his feet," along with other "audacious expressions contrary to the Priv­
ilege of Peerage."^ The Lords_f Committee of Privileges often dealt with 
scandalous words against peers, such as those contained in a petition
said to be "much derogatory to the honour of Lord Gerard,"^ or those
*
allegedly spoken by a French merchant in 1664, claiming the Earl of Berk­
shire had received stolen goods of his.^ In 1666, Lord Morley complained 
of being assaulted in the street and insulted with "base and reviling 
l a n g u a g e ; "10 that same year, the Earl of St. Albans complained of "unbe-
8Journals of the House of Lords, XI, 79, 198-199, 202-203, 211- 
212. This case was cited by Schoenfeld, Restored House of Lords, 129-130. 
For the Act of Oblivion (12 Car, II, c. 11), see J. P. Kenyon, ed., The 
Stuart Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), 365-370.
^Journals of the House of Lords, XI, 540.
8Ibid., XI, 542, 545, 558. 9Ibid., XI, 652. 10Ibid., XII, 8.
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coming language" directed against him after the arrest of one of his 
servants;11 and in 1667, the Earl of Denbigh complained of "scandalous 
and saucy expressions" directed against him in a p e t i t i o n . T h e  sensi­
tivity to insulting language displayed in these examples illustrates 
the concern, if not the alarm, with which the nobility reacted to signs 
of disrespect.
This reaction to disrespect found expression not only in the 
House of Lords but also in the courts, where peers enjoyed a highly 
privileged legal status.H Among their legal privileges was the right 
to bring actions of scandalum magnatum, "so tender" was the law of Eng­
land to the "honour, credit, reputation and persons of noblemen."1^ It 
was the sixteenth-century civil interpretation of this medieval law 
which best served the interests of noblemen, as it enabled them to sue 
for damages in cases of scandalous words. The disposition of the judi­
ciary in the reign of Charles II, committed as the judges were to up­
holding the royal prerogative and supporting the new regime in general, ^  
encouraged peers to avail themselves of the special remedy offered by 
the law in defense of their reputations. Having inherited much of the 
criminal jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Court of Star Chamber in
i:LIbid., XII, 85. 12Ibid., XII, 129, 131.
l^For a description of the legal privileges of the peerage, see 
Schoenfeld, Restored House of Lords, 127-137.
•^Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia, 223; cf. John Brydall, Prlvilegia 
Magnatum apud Anglos (London, 1704; microfilm reprint, New Haven, Conn., 
1974), 15.
I C
For the later Stuart judiciary, see Edward Foss’s biographical 
accounts, The Judges of England (London, 1864), Vol. VII; Kenyon, Stuart 
Constitution, Ch. 12; A. F. Havighurst, "The Judiciary and Politics in 
the Reign of Charles II," Law Quarterly Review, 66 (1950), 62, 229; and 
G. W. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart Cause (London, 1965), 
especially Ch. 5.
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cases of defamation,^ the common law courts, especially King's Bench, 
observed a number of rules which made it easy for noblemen to win favor­
able decisions. Words spoken against a peer, for instance, were to be 
taken "in the worst sense against the speaker"— rather than in mitiori
sensu, as would have been the case with words spoken against a commoner—
"that the honour of such great persons may be preserved," as Chief Jus­
tice Kelyng explained in 1670.^ This rule enabled noblemen to bring 
suits and win large sums in damages for the slightest remarks, such as
those spoken against Lord Townsend— "He is an unworthy man and acts
against law and reason"— for which he was awarded 4000_1 in damages.
Despite occasional protests from men like Justice Atkyns, who 
insisted in 1677, that "every unmannerly word is not actionable though 
it be spoken to a l o r d , " - ^  the post-Restoration courts almost without 
exception ruled in favor of insulted noblemen and awarded them sizeable 
sums in damages. Most of the words held actionable in cases of scan­
dalum magnatum during the first half of the reign of Charles II were 
little more than words which imputed baseness to a nobleman. In 1664, 
for instance, the Marquis of Dorchester brought a successful action of 
scandalum magnatum against a man named Proby for saying "I value my Lord
16
See Plucknett, Concise History, 440. Edmund Hickeringill, him­
self the victim of an action of scandalum magnatum in 1682, once referred 
to the Court of King's Bench as the "new Star Chamber." See his The 
Ceremony Monger (London, 1689; microfilm reprint, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970), 
5.
■^Earl of Peterborough v. Sir John Mordant, 1 Ventris 60, 86 Eng. 
Rep. 42 (1670); cf. Brydall, Privilegia Magnatum, 15.
l^Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (1677). 
For the origins of this case, see the Journals of the House of Lords, XIII, 
23, 30.
■^Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 1 Freeman 223, 89 Eng. Rep. 159
(1677).
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Marquis of Dorchester no more than I value the dog at my foot."20 In 
1672, these words were held actionable: "The Earl of Pembroke is of so
little esteem in the country, that no man of reputation hath any esteem 
for him; he is a pitiful fellow, and no man will take his word for two­
pence; and no man of reputation values him more than I value the dirt 
under my feet."21 In 1675, the Earl of Salisbury obtained a favorable 
verdict for the words "My Lord S. may kiss my a— , I care not a t—  for
9 9him, he keeps none but a company of rogues about him." Englishmen 
frequently showed they were not lacking in vocabulary when it came to 
abusing their betters.
The arguments employed during the post-1660 period in defense 
of the civil interpretation of scandalum magnatum closely resembled 
those employed by Sir Edward Coke in the Star Chamber case De Libellis 
Famosis in 1605, in defense of the criminal interpretation of libel 
against a magistrate.23 in 1669, it was argued that "such great men 
being publick make words actionable which otherwise are not."24 In keep­
ing with this line of reasoning, civil actions of scandalum magnatum
20Proby v. The Marquis of Dorchester (in error of judgment), 1 
Levinz 148, 83 Eng. Rep. 342 (1664); 1 Siderfin 233, 82 Eng. Rep. 107 7 
(1664). Thomas Siderfin reported that Proby "fuit tue in un duell en 
Covent Garden," and Creswell Levinz had it personally from the Marquis 
that after Proby's death his executors paid the damages.
21-Earl of Pembroke v. Staniel, 1 Freeman 49, 89 Eng. Rep. 38 (1672).
^Lcird Salisbury v. Charles Arthur (Pasch. 27 Car. II in B. R.), 
cited by Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law (Philadelphia, 1856), 
VIII, 595.
^ De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co, Rep. 125-126a, 77 Eng, Rep. 250-252 
(1605). See above, pages 32-36,
2^Lord Peterborough v. Mordant, 2 Keble 559, 84 Eng. Rep. 351 
(1669); cf. De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 251; and 
March, Actions for Slaunder, 136.
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were frequently brought tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso, "as well 
on behalf of our lord the king as the plaintiff himself" (though the 
plaintiff still recovered all the damages).^5 Peers of the realm were 
"look’d on as the King’s Hereditary Constant C o u n c i l l o r s ; " ^  thus, to 
speak "rude, uncivil, and ill-natured words" of them was interpreted as 
a reflection "upon the King who is the fountain of honour, that gives 
it to such persons who are (in his judgment) deserving by which they are 
made capable of advising him in Parliament . . ."27 As with nearly all 
the important privileges of the English peerage, this one was held, 
theoretically at least, by virtue of membership in Parliament, and not 
merely by virtue of membership in an aristocratic class.28
In the 1670’s, actions of scandalum magnatum were becoming more
29numerous, as Justice Atkyns impatiently observed in 1677. Charles 
Hatton, writing to his brother in 1676, described several such actions,? 
which, he noted, "are very numerous." Among them was one brought by 
Lord Mohun against a man for saying "he wase good for nothing but to sit 
in ladyes chambers and thred their needles," and a double action brought 
by Lord Petre against two men, one for saying "he wase a pimpeing Ld 
and no gentleman," the other for saying "if he wou'd leave out the latter
25Count of Standford [Stamford] v. Nedham, 1 Lev. 56, 83 Eng. Rep. 
295 (1662); Earl Thanet v. Graham, 3 Keble 39, 84 Eng. Rep. 582 (1672);
Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 167, 86 Eng. Rep. 1003 (1677); Earl 
of Macclesfield v. Starkey (1684), 10 State Trials 1329; Bacon, New 
Abridgment, VIII, 596.
^Chamberlayne, Angliae Notltia, 220.
^Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 157, 86 Eng, Rep. 998 (1677).
^ S e e  Turberville, House of Lords in the Reign of William III^
63; cf. Justice Scroggs’ opinion in Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod.
159, 86 Eng. Rep. 999.
^Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 154, 86 Eng. Rep. 997 (1677).
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Of\
words he would prove the former.’ Increasingly, however, actions of 
scandalum magnatum reflected more than simply the reactions of noblemen 
to signs of disrespect from their social inferiors; by the late 1670’s, 
as they became more numerous, these actions began to reflect the growing 
divisions within English politics. Noblemen, though still zealous in 
the preservation of their honor, status, and reputation, were now dis­
covering in their old protective weapon of scandalum magnatum a very 
useful political weapon, one which possessed the potential for great 
destruction.
The political crisis which dominated the last decade of the reign 
of Charles II saw England divided into parties, primarily over the issue 
of the exclusion of the Duke of York from the succession. During these 
years, politics became a dangerous game, the object of which was to 
destroy one’s enemies, or, barring immediate success in that goal, at 
least to discredit them, to ruin them financially, or to put them behind 
bars for a while. The Earl of Shaftesbury, famed for his leadership in 
the Country (Whig) party, was one of the first political contestants to 
appreciate the value of scandalum magnatum as a means for achieving 
these destructive goals. His earlier legal training had more than likely 
acquainted him with the statutes, thus preparing him in 1676 to invoke 
them in an action against Lord Digby for words provoked by a political 
dispute. 3-*- Shaftesbury, in a letter to his secretary, described the
30Charles Hatton to Viscount Hatton, 11 May 1676, Correspondence 
of the family of Hatton, ed. E. M, Thompson (London, 1878), I, 124. This 
reference was cited by A. S. Turberville, ’’House of Lords under Charles 
II," English Historical Review, 45 (1930)9 75n.
31So contends Shaftesbury’s most recent biographer, K. H. D. 
Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), 407. Though citing 
no source, Haley attributes Shaftesbury’s recourse to an action of scan­
dalum magnatum in 1676 to his days at Lincoln's Inn where he would have
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circumstances out of which the quarrel and the subsequent legal action 
arose. In brief, the death of Colonel Strangeways had left vacant a 
seat in Parliament for which Lord Digby, son of the (still-living) Earl 
of Bristol, stood unopposed in 1675. At first, Shaftesbury supported 
Digby, but soon learned "from a very good hand" that Digby "would not 
prove as some of us expected." He began to have doubts about the role 
of Lord Digby in "the designs of some of our great men above," and so 
persuaded a gentleman named Moore to challenge Digby in the election.
Of course, having counted on standing for the seat unopposed and with
Shaftesbury's support, Digby was naturally angered by this move. Shaftes­
bury's personal explanation to Digby that "the reason I was not for him 
was that I was assured he was not for us" did not heal the breach, and 
when the two met by accident one day, "before a good deal of company
and ladies," Digby denounced the Earl for being against him, contending
that he was "for the King and his country," while Shaftesbury was "against 
the King and for a commonwealth," adding that he would have Shaftesbury's
head at the next P a r l i a m e n t .^2
It was for these words that Shaftesbury brought his action of 
scandalum magnatum, and he had some twenty witnesses to prove that they 
were indeed the words of Lord Digby. The case came to trial in the 
spring of 1676 with Shaftesbury alleging damages in the sum of 20,000_1, 
and on April 26, verdict was given for the plaintiff, though he was
heard "the stories of Sir Edward Coke's first case . . ." (Lord Cromwell's
case, 1578), as if to suggest there were no recent precedents for such 
an action. A more likely explanation might simply be that Shaftesbury 
was familiar with cases which had been decided in recent years or those 
currently pending in the courts.
■^Shaftesbury to Mr. Bennet, 28 August 1675, in W. D. Christie,
A Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury (London, 1871), 
II, 216-218.
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awarded only lOOOJL in d a m a g e s . ^3 The case was far from over, however, 
as a week later, on May 3, Digby*s counsel moved in arrest of judgment 
because of Shaftesbury's alleged misrecital of the statute on which the 
action was brought (2 Richard II, c. 5). 34 The matter remained undecided 
for several weeks while the judges debated whether the misrecital was 
material or not, naturally to the displeasure not only of Shaftesbury, 
but also of "severall other Lords, who will find it more difficult to 
recover great fines upon actions of. scandalum magnatum," as Charles
o c
Hatton noted in his letter of May 11. Finally, however, on June 3,
Chief Justice Rainsford delivered the opinion of the court, "that the 
plaintiff ought to have his judgment," that the misrecital had been 
immaterial, Shaftesbury having "recited as much as is sufficient for an 
earl."36
Shaftesbury’s servant Stringer reported the success to John 
Locke (who was then abroad), declaring the final outcome of the trial to 
be "the greatest vindication of my Lord in that concern of the election 
that could be imagined." The relatively small sum of lOOOJL awarded in 
damages (small when compared to that originally alleged by Shaftesbury) 
had been decided upon because "Digby had but a small estate in hand," 
and because the jury "were not willing to perpetuate a feud between two
33Earl of Shaftesbury v. Lord Digby, 3 Keble 631, 84 Eng. Rep.
920 (1676).
34Ibid., 3 Keble 641, 84 Eng. Rep. 927 (1676); cf. Lord Cromwell’s 
case, 4 Co. Rep. 12b, 76 Eng. Rep. 879 (1578); and Viscount Say and Seal 
v. Stephens, Cro. Car. 135, 79 Eng. Rep, 719 (1629),
35Charles Hatton to Viscount Hatton, 11 May 1676, Hatton Corre­
spondence, I, 126,
36Earl of Shaftesbury v. Lord Digby, 3 Keble 661, 84 Eng. Rep.
938 (1676).
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noble families;" otherwise, contended Stringer, "they would have given 
much greater d a m a g e s . D i g b y  should have had little problem paying 
the damages, however, as the "gentlemen of Dorsetshire, to expresse how 
much they disliked the verdict for the Lord Shaftesbury, . . . subscribed 
to present my Lord Digby with 30002^"^ And far from ending what was 
essentially a political feud between Shaftesbury and the Earl of Bristol, 
the case only aggravated the bad relations between them.
The ultimate success of the action of scandalum magnatum brought 
in 1676 by Shaftesbury against Digby proved the usefulness of what course 
of law not only as a defense of honor but also as a political weapon.
In so proving, it foreshadowed the course which would be taken by many 
noblemen on both sides of the political arena in the coming years. What 
initiated most actions of scandalum magnatum in the following decade was, 
of course, the Exclusion crisis, which by 1681 had come dangerously 
close to dividing England once again into two armed camps. Perhaps iron­
ically, in December 1680, before any major actions were brought, a clause 
calling for "repeal of the Laws de Scandalis Magnatum*1 was added in the 
House of Commons to a bill "for the better regulating the Tryal of the
Peers of England." In attaching this amendment, however, the Commons,
*•
dominated by the Whigs, had acted "not out of any expectation that the 
Lords would pass it," as Anchitell Grey observed, but rather simply to 
kill the bill altogether, an example of the Whigs’ refusal to see any
37.T. Stringer to J. Locke, 5 June 1676, in Christie, Shaftesbury, 
II, 222-223.
^Charles Hatton to Viscount Hatton, 18 May 1676, Hatton Corre­
spondence , I, 126,
39xhe two earls were enemies in Parliament, often involved in 
heated debate. For examples, see Christie, Shaftesbury, II, 219.
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constructive legislation enacted while the Lords stood in the way of 
Exclusion. Thus, the privilege allowed by the laws of scandalum magnatum 
remained untouched, leaving the way open for noblemen to bring destruc­
tion upon their adversaries in the years immediately following.
In the History of His Own Time, Bishop Burnet recalled how various 
peers "brought actions of scandalum magnatum against those who in the 
time of our great heat had spoke foul things of them," observing that 
"great damages were given by obsequious and zealous j u r i e s . The accu­
racy of Burnet’s recollection is borne out by a large number of sources, 
most of them dating from 1681-1686, ranging from detailed court records 
and government documents to the casual observations of contemporaries. 
Narcissus Luttrell’s Brief Relation of State Affairs, supplemented by 
relevant legal materials, provides probably the most complete picture. 
Nearly all of. the best known participants in the political warfare arising 
out of attempts to exclude the Duke of York from the throne became 
involved either as plaintiffs or defendants in actions of scandalum 
magnatum.
On June 3, 1681, Luttrell recorded that the Earl of Danby brought 
actions of scandalum magnatum "against certain booksellers, for printing 
the evidence against him as to sir Edmondbury Godfrey’s death." Danby 
had been a prisoner in the Tower of London since his impeachment by the 
House of Commons in 1678, a fact which prompted Luttrell to write: "it
will be worth considering what damages a man impeacht of treason, and
40
Journals of the House of Commons, IX, 681; Anchitell Grey, 
Debates of the House of Commons (London, 1763), VIII, 175; Journals of 
the House of Lords, XIII, 719, 721. For a general account of the politics 
of the Exclusion crisis, see J. R, Jones, The First Whigs (London, 1961).
^Gilbert Burnet, Bishop Burnet’s History of His Own Time (Oxford, 
1832), II, 430; see also 10 State Trials 1331.
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against whom a bill for the said murther is found, is likely to obtain."4  ^
On December 7, 1681, Luttrell observed that the Earl of Shaftesbury, him­
self recently a prisoner, "since his releasement, hath been advising with 
councill how he may right himself against those who have scandalously 
traduced him: against some he intends to bring actions of scandalum
magnatum, and against others writs of conspiracy."43 By December 10, 
writs were issued on his behalf against at least four men for scandalum 
magnatum: Edmund Warcup, a Justice of the Peace; Richard Graham, a 
solicitor; John Booth, a man of "mean condition;" and a Mr. Cradock, a 
mercer in Paternoster Row.44
The cases against Graham and Cradock became highly publicized,
providing Tory lampoon artists with ample subject matter for their attacks
on Shaftesbury. "Potapski," as he was derisively labelled, was depicted
as possessed "with large hopes of Damages," while Graham and Cradock were
depicted as heroes:
And from the careless, honest, Loyal Rout,
Two grand Offenders soon were singled out,
For tainting Peerage with a Traitor's Name,
And mudding the clear fountain of his Fame;43
The charges against Graham and Cradock had indeed resulted from their 
calling the Earl a traitor, which under ordinary circumstances would have 
been ample grounds for a decision in favor of the plaintiff,4^ but when
^ N a r c i s s u s  Luttrell, A Brief Relation of State Affairs (Oxford, 
1857), I, 93-94.
43Ibid., I, 150.
44ibid,; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1680-1681, 612-613.
43Scandalum Magnatum: or, Potapski's Case. A Satyr Against
Polish Oppression (London, 1682), 9-10.
lt(\As in the case of Viscount Say and Seal v. Stephens, Cro. Car.
135, 79 Eng. Rep. 719. See above, pages 56 and 57.
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Cradock’s case came to trial in 1682, the defendant moved "that by reason 
of the great interest of my Lord in London, he could not have an indif­
ferent t r i a l . 7 Cradock was requesting a change in venue, normally not 
granted in cases of scandalum magnatum, when it was assumed that the 
plaintiff, being a peer in Parliament, could choose "to lay his action 
where it is most convenient for h i m s e l f . I n  this case, however, the 
court claimed the power to alter the venue, and did so on the basis of 
affadavits from seven "substantial citizens1' stating in effect that the 
Earl had close connections with Thomas Pilkington, a Whig sheriff of 
London, who would have had a hand in the selection of a jury.^9 Faced 
with this ruling, Shaftesbury decided to let his actions against both 
Cradock and Graham drop, seriously damaging his chances of righting him­
self against any of those who had "scandalously traduced" him.
Shaftesbury’s enemies, however, met with greater success than he 
did in their actions of scandalum magnatum, and though they never sued 
him for the offence, they wasted no time in attacking his associates.
In 1681, for instance, William Hetherington, one of Shaftesbury’s agents, 
was arrested in an action of scandalum magnatum brought by the Duke of 
O r m o n d e .50 On May 3, 1683, the case was brought to trial in Surrey, with
47
Lord Shaftesbury v.Craddock, Skinner 40, 90 Eng. Rep. 20 (1682).
^Count of Stamford v. Nedham, 1 Lev. 56, 83 Eng. Rep. 295 (1662).
^Earl of Shaftesbury v.Cradocke, Jones 192, 84 Eng. Rep. 1212 
(1682). It was well known that both grand juries and trial juries in 
London were controlled by the Whigs at this time. The sheriffs and under­
sheriffs who prepared lists of jurymen were Whigs and made certain that 
none but Whigs appeared on them. See Keeton, Jeffreys, 97.
5^Earl of Longford to Ormonde, 8 November 1681, Historical Manu­
scripts Commission, Calendar of'the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde 
(London, 1911), n.s., VI, 219-220. Longford wrote in cipher "Shaftesbury's 
friends clamour much against you for this." See also Calendar of State 
Papers, Domestic, 1680-1681, 554.
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Edmund Warcup as a witness for Ormonde; and, as Luttrell recorded, "the 
defendant making little defense, the jury without goeing from the barr, 
found for the plaintiff and gave him 10,000_1 damages; upon which Hether­
ington rendered himself into custody in discharge of his b a i l . O t h e r  
actions of scandalum magnatum brought by noblemen against those "who in 
the time of our great heat had spoke foul things of them" included that 
brought in 1682 by Lord Lovelace, a "violent Whig," in which he recovered 
20001. in damages.^2 That same year, the Earl of Clarendon, a supporter 
of the Duke of York, brought an action against "one Mr. Thomas Hooper, 
for words spoke at the late election of parliament men for the town of 
Christchurch in Hampshire." Hooper had allegedly called Clarendon "a 
papist, a maintainer and upholder of popery, and an enemy to the King 
and kingdom," for which words the Earl was awarded 100 marks in damages 
and 40s. in costs, despite the defendants contention that the words 
were provoked by the Earl's calling him a rascal and offering to "fillip 
him on the nose."^
Since prelates enjoyed the same protection from scandalous words 
offered by the law to noblemen, it is not suprising to find Henry 
Compton, Bishop of London, bringing an action of scandalum magnatum 
against Edmund Hickeringill, vicar of All Saints, Colchester. Hickeringill 
was an ecclesiastical eccentric, described by Luttrell in 1684 as having 
"for two or three years past been very abusive' to the archbishop of
"^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 256-257.
^^Ibid., I, 171; for Lord Lovelace, see Cokayne, The Complete 
Peerage, VIII, 232.
■^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 188, 198; for the Earl of Claren­
don (son of Edward Hyde, First Earl of Clarendon), see Cokayne, The Com­
plete Peerage, III, 266.
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Canterbury, the bishop of London, and the clergy in generall."-^ At a 
vestry meeting in April 1681, he had reportedly attacked Compton as "a 
bold, daring, and impudent man," and claimed he could "prove his Lord­
ship to be concerned in the damnable Popish plot.'1 For these words, 
the Bishop brought an action of scandalum magnatum, and when the case 
was brought before the Chelmsford Assizes on March 8, 1682, he was 
awarded 20001 in damages. Two years later, Hickeringill made a com­
plete public apology for his "heinous crimes and offences," and Compton 
was pursuaded to remit the d a m a g e s . I t  was perhaps fitting that a 
prelate should remit his damages; few noblemen ever proved so generous, 
though there were exceptions such as Lord North, who in 1683 withdrew 
his action of scandalum magnatum against a parson named Elliot after the 
parson "submitted himself to his lordship and beg’d his pardon in open 
court, so that his lordship very generously forgave him."^
Most of the cases of scandalum magnatum described thus far illus­
trate the reactionary nature of the period following 1681. The furor 
of the Popish plot had subsided and the King had remained firm in his 
opposition to Exclusion. The result was the disintegration of the Whig 
cause and the onset of a period of royalist reaction, culminating in the 
aftermath of the abortive Rye House plot in 1683. As a rule, with the
54
Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 312. Hickeringill s views on the 
subject of scandalum magnatum are set out in The Ceremony Monger, 5-8.
■^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 170, 186, 192-193; Scandalum 
Magnatum: or, the Great Trial at Chelmsford Assizes (London, 1682),
cited by Edward Carpenter, The Protestant Bishop (London, 1956), 234-235.
^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 249; cf. Lord Townsend v. Dr, 
Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (1677), where one of the jurors con­
fessed the jury "gave such great damages to the plaintiff (not that he 
was damnified so much) but that he might have the greater opportunity to 
show himself noble in the remitting of them." Any expectations the jury 
might have had about Lord Townsend proved to be unfounded.
judiciary under their control, the Tories benefited most from the law 
of scandalum magnatum in the last two years of the reign of Charles II 
and during the reign of James II. Their success is illustrated by the 
actions brought by the Duke of Beaufort in 1683 against Sir Trevor Wil-
c 7
liams and John Arnold, both for 10,0001_, and those brought by the Earl 
of Peterborough in 1686 against Sir William Williams, Speaker of the 
House of Commons in 1680, and several others for the publication of 
Dangerfield’s Narrative, for which the Earl not only was awarded but 
actually recovered in payment over 67001^ in damages.^ The Whigs how­
ever, were not without some success in their recourse to the law during 
this reactionary period, as the Earl of Macclesfield demonstrated in 
1684 when he brought actions of scandalum magnatum against John Starkey, 
Sir Thomas Grosvenor, and other members of a Cheshire grand jury which, 
after the Rye House plot, had presented the Earl as "being a confederate 
with those concerned in the late conspiracy, . . .  a seditious addressor 
to the knights of the shire, . . . .  a riotous, tumultuous receiver and 
entertainer of the duke of Monmouth, . . . a frequenter of conventicles,
and a harborer of non-conformists." Denying these charges, the Earl 
claimed to be "much wounded in his honour," and in his action against 
John Starkey, he was awarded 10,000.1 in damages. ^
57Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 291; Burnet, History, I, 430; 10 
State Trials 1332. For the conflict between Beaufort and John Arnold, 
see John Miller, Popery and Politics in England (London, 1973), 61, 152.
-^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 338; 13 State Trials 1437-1442; 
Earl of Peterborough v. Williams, Comb. 42, 90 Eng. Rep. 332 (1687).
^Earl of Macclesfield v. Starkey (1684), 10 State Trials 1333, 
1343; Earl of .Macclesfield’s Case (v. Sir Thomas Grosvenor), 3 Mod. 41, 
87 Eng. Rep. 25-26 (1684); Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 305; Historical 
Manuscripts Commission, Portland Manuscripts (London, 1893), II, 156; 
Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Gerard, Charles, Earl of Maccles­
field.
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The largest number and most destructive of the actions of 
scandalum magnatum brought during the last four years of the reign of 
Charles II, however, were those brought by the King's brother, James 
Duke of York. For the years 1682-1684, Luttrell recorded no less than 
ten different cases of scandalum magnatum in which the Duke of York was 
plaintiff, and in half of them, damages were alleged in the sum of 
100,000]L, an unprecedented figure.^ so destructive were these actions 
that in 1684, when Sir Francis Drake learned that His Royal Highness 
had commenced one against him "for words spoken by him of the Duke about 
four years since," he "thought fitt to abscond," and, according to Lut­
trell, "is since gone beyond sea, and has . . . dispos'd of his estate,
thinking it better to have his liberty in a foreign country than be laid 
up in his own for 100,0001."^
As early as 1670, the Duke of York had availed himself of the 
remedy offered by the statutes of scandalum magnatum, bringing an action 
then "for words touching p o p e r y . T h e  actions he brought in the 1680*s, 
however, were not only for words touching his religion, but also for 
words touching "that which is much dearer to him than his life, his 
honour, by charging him with the foulest of crimes, treason, and breach 
of his allegiance," as Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys described those 
spoken against him by Titus Oates in 1684.^ The verbal abuse heaped 
upon the Duke of York during the years of the Popish plot and Exclusion
60Burnet, History, I, 536. "The most excessive that had ever been
given."
^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 307.
^Thomas Jones to Dr. Turner (Chaplain to the Duke of York), 18 
June 1681, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1680-1681, 319.
6310 State Trials 142.
crisis was enormous. The worst of it came from the infamous Dr. Oates 
who considered the Duke to be no less a villain than the Devil, and who 
on one occasion was reported to have said, "he is a Rascal, a Papist and 
a Traitor, and I hope to live to see him h a n g e d . "64 Oates paid dearly 
for these and other words, as did Thomas Pilkington, the Whig sheriff of 
London, who once remarked at a meeting of the Court of Aldermen at the 
Guildhall that the Duke of York "had burnt the citty and was now come 
to cut the citizens’ throats.11 When Pilkington was brought to trial for 
these words in 1682, he made "little defense" and the Duke was awarded 
100,000^1 in damages.65 The same fate awaited a Mr. Speak (probably Hugh 
Speke) in 1683, John Dutton Colt, a member of Parliament, in 1684, and 
of course Titus Oates.66
When Oates' case came to trial in June 1684, he made no defense 
and so "lett judgment passe by d e f a u l t . A  writ of inquiry was then 
issued to the sheriff of Middlesex "to enquire by a jury of that county 
what damages the plaintiff had sustained." After a reading of the 
King’s writ— a lengthy document declaring that "the said James duke of 
York and Albany, our only brother, in his reputation, honour and dignity 
is very much hurt and scandalized"— a number of witnesses were paraded 
before the jury to testify to the seriousness of the injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff. Following their testimony, Chief Justice Jeffreys 
turned to the jury and delivered a long oration denouncing Oates and
64Ibid., 138.
^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 240; The Duke of York v. Pilkington, 
Skinner 71, 90 Eng, Rep. 34 (1682).
^Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 287, 307, 310.
67Ibid., 310.
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lamenting "this corrupt age, this profligate age, wherein we live, and 
wherein common ordinary fellows, the mere scum and scoundrels of the 
factious party, have taken the liberty to reproach and calumniate magis­
tracy and government, and the greatest personages concerned in it, not 
sparing even majesty itself, nor him, who is next in degree to his sacred 
person, his only dear and royal brother." Awed by the Chief Justice’s 
rhetoric, the jury, without leaving the bar, dutifully awarded the plain­
tiff full damages, 100,0001, and 20s. costs.^ As. for Oates, as Bishop 
Burnet observed, this action "shut him up in a perpetual i m p r i s o n m e n t , " ^  
that essentially being the purpose of such action.
The magnitude of these actions of scandalum magnatum and the 
frequency with which they were brought, not only by the Duke of York, 
but by other peers as well, were bound to create an unfavorable reaction 
among those who experienced or witnessed their effect.^0 This reaction 
was most vocally expressed in the House of Commons after 1689 when 
several attempts were made there to reverse judgments in cases of scan­
dalum magnatum. Soon after the Revolution, in July 1689, a bill was 
introduced to reverse the judgment given by the Court of King’s Bench 
against Sir William Williams who, as speaker of the House of Commons in 
1680, had licensed Dangerfield’s Narrative for publication, only to be 
sued in 1686 by the Earl of Peterborough for scandalum magnatum on account 
of certain reflections against him contained in the Narrative. The bill, 
however, failed to pass in 1689 and met the same fate twice again, in 1690 
and in 1695, despite the House of Commons’ having declared the judgment
/■ o AQ
10 State Trials 125-148. Burnet, History, I, 591.
^flickeringill, The Ceremony Monger, 5-8,
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to be illegal and subsersive of the freedom of parliament,^ Likewise,
in 1690, an attempt was made to reverse the judgment against John Arnold,
who had been sued in 1683 for scandalum magnatum by the Duke of Beaufort.
The bill for reversal, sent to the Lords in December 1690, read as follows:
Whereas this kingdom has of late years been most unhappily 
divided into parties and factions through men’s different 
apprehensions of the public interest, and the prevailing 
passions and prejudices did so far bias and corrupt the 
Courts of Justice that the public administration thereof 
was become partial, and thereby divers persons, upon mis­
takes and small offences (wrested by innuendoes) were 
ruined, both them and their families, some by excessive 
fines imposed by the Court, and others by exorbitant dam­
ages given by juries; and Whereas a verdict was given 
against John Arnold . . . for the sum of IOjOOOJL . . .in 
an action brought against him by Henry Duke of Beaufort 
in the Court of King’s Bench at Westminster; and Whereas 
Judgment and Execution was sued out thereupon, and the said 
John Arnold continued a Prisoner thereupon for several 
years in the prison of the King’s Bench, whereby he hath 
severely suffered both in his person and estate for words 
from which (suppose they had been spoken) the Duke of Beau­
fort did not suffer any real damage; therefore, be it 
enacted by the King and Queen’s most Excellent Majesties, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual 
and Temporal and Commons in this present Parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, that the said 
Verdict and Judgment given in the said action brought 
against the said John Arnold, and all executions and pro­
ceedings upon the same, shall be reversed, annulled and 
made void, and are hereby Declared and Adjuged to be 
reversed, annulled and made void to all intents and pur­
poses whatsoever.72
Despite its eloquent statement of principle, this bill was also rejected, 
predictably, by the Lords, who still valued their old legal weapon though 
they were now less inclined to use it.
Actions of scandalum magnatum declined sharply in number and in
^ Journals of the House of Commons, X, 215; Dictionary of National 
Biography, s.v. "Williams, Sir William;” 13 State Trials 1438-1439; 
Luttrell, Brief Relation, I, 558; Burnet, History, II, 430-431.
^ Manuscripts of the House of Lords, III, 1690/91, 208; see also
Journals of the House of Lords, XIV, 579.
magnitude after the 1680’s, partially as a result of the hostile reaction 
created by those brought by the Duke of York, the Earl of Peterborough, 
the Duke of Beaufort, and others during the 1680's. Also, the courts 
freed from the likes of Pemberton, Scroggs, and Jeffreys, were now less 
willing to award large sums in damages to noblemen whose honor had 
allegedly been insulted, nor were they as willing to commit offenders to 
’’perpetual imprisonment” of the sort which had removed Titus Oates, John 
Arnold, and a good many others from the scene during the 1680?s. For 
instance, when an unfortunate fellow named Murrey was convicted in 1700 
for calling the Duke of Schomberg a cheat, Chief Justice Holt, in marked 
contrast to his predecessors, denied the plaintiff’s request for special 
bail on the grounds that "this being a poor man, to charge him thus will 
be a perpetual imprisonment to him.” Instead, two men were called upon 
to "swear themselves worth twenty-five pounds each," and Murrey himself,; 
was bound over in the relatively small sum of 1003^.73
Also, by virtue of a ruling in 1687, noblemen were no longer 
awarded court costs along with damages inactions of scandalum magnatum,74 
serving in many cases to discourage them from becoming engaged in lengthy 
litigation. When the defendant made no defense and iet judgment pass 
by default, as Hetherington did in 1683 or as Oates did in 1684, costs 
were nominal, usually no more than 20 or 40 shillings. But when the 
defendant made an elaborate defense and prolonged his trial, as Lord 
Digby did in 1676 by alleging misrecital, costs could build up; in that
^Duke of Schomberg v. Murrey, Holt, K. B. 640, 90 Eng. Rep. 1254 
Cl700); 12 Mod. 420, 88 Eng. Rep. 1423 (1700).
7^Earl of Peterborough v, Williams, 2 Shower 505-506, 89 Eng. Rep. 
1068 (1687); 13 State Trials 1437; W. B. Odgers, Libel and Slander 
(Philadelphia, 1887), 105.
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particular instance, Stringer reported to Locke that he had "taxed 1521 
for costs (besides the damages) on my Lord D i g b y . A  sum of that size, 
though small when compared to the amount awarded in damages, might come 
as an unwanted financial burden, especially when the defendant proved un­
able to pay the damages in the first place, going instead to jail. It 
is not surprising to find, therefore, in the relatively few cases of 
scandalum magnatum tried in the last two decades of the seventeenth cen­
t u m  and in the eighteenth century, attempts being made by defendants 
to prolong or complicate the proceedings, usually by requesting changes 
in venue or making technical o b j e c t i o n s , ^  no doubt in hopes of getting 
the plaintiff to drop charges (as Shaftesbury did in 1682) rather than 
face costs.
With the courts no longer awarding thousands of pounds in damages 
and with costs no longer included even with a favorable verdict, the pro­
tection offered by the law from scandalum magnatum often seemed hardly 
worth invoking when the words alleged were no more than inconsequential 
aspersions upon one's honor or merely derogatory remarks. Viscount 
Falkland found this to be the case in 1734 when he brought an action of 
scandalum magnatum against one Nathaniel Phipps for calling him a "vil­
lainous rogue,” a "scrub," and a "scoundrel," for which he alleged 500(11 
in damages, only to be awarded a mere 501^  and this after lengthy proceed­
ings during which he was ludicrously required to "prove himself a peer."^
^Stringer to Locke, 5 June 1676, in Chrisite, Shaftesbury, II, 
226. See above, pages 69-70.
^See, for example, Duke of Norfolkv. Alderton, 12 Mod. 121, 88 
Eng. Rep. 1207 (1697); Duke of Richmond v. Costelow, 11 Mod. 234-235, 88 
Eng. Rep. 1010 (1710).
^Lord Viscount Falkland v, Phipps, 2 Comyns 439-440, 92 Eng.
Rep. 1149-1150 (1734).
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Despite such results as those encountered by Viscount Falkland, the 
statutes of scandalum magnatum were still counted among the privileges 
of the peerage during the early eighteenth century and even as late as 
1765 when Blackstone included them in his Commentaries.^  The majority 
of the House of Lords, however, ceased to be very enthusiastic about 
preserving this privilege, agreeing, in fact, to part with it in 1719 
as an inducement to the Commons to accept the Peerage Bill.^ Of course, 
with the failure of the Peerage Bill to pass the Commons, the statutes 
of scandalum magnatum survived untouched, as in 1680, and actually 
remained on the statute books until 1887 when they were finally repealed, 
as having "by lapse of time . . . become unnecessary."^0
It can be argued that the statutes had become unnecessary as 
early as 1700, though a thin stream of cases can be traced through the 
eighteenth century,81 ending, it seems, in 1773 when the Earl of Sand­
wich brought an action of scandalum magnatum against the publisher of 
the London Evening Post for charging him in his capacity as First Lord
^William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 
1765-1768; reprint ed., New York, 1965), I, 390; III, 123-124. See also 
The Laws of Honor (London, 1714), 217.
^ Se e  Lord Middleton's Memorandum ("Conversation between lord 
Sunderland and me about the peerage bill"), reprinted in John Naylor, ed., 
The British Aristocracy and the Peerage Bill of 1719 (New York, 1968),
170; and William Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir 
Robert Walpole (London, 1800), I, 207; and A. S. Turberville, The House 
of Lords in the XVIIIth Century (Oxford, 1927; reprint ed., Wesport,
Conn., 1970), 180.
®^50 and 51 Victoria, c. 59 (Statute Law Revision Act, 1887).
Q 1
The statement by a number of legal historians that the last 
action of scandalum magnatum came in 1710 is of course incorrect. This 
error found its way into several respected legal works: Bacon, New Abridg­
ment , VIII, 597; Odgers, Libel and Slander, 105; Frank Carr, "The English 
Law of Defamation," Law Quarterly Review, 18 (1902), 263; and Van Vechten 
Veeder, "The History of the Law of Defamation," Select Essays in Anglo- 
American Legal History (Boston, 1909), 454*
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of the Admiralty with having sold certain naval offices.82 This offence 
was more in the nature of a libel, however, since the words written 
against the Earl of Sandwich would have been held actionable under the 
law of libel, just as those which appeared in 1786 in the Morning Herald 
charging William Pitt with gambling in government funds were held action­
able, not as scandalum magnatum, since Pitt was a commoner, but simply 
as l i b e l . T h e  part of the law which had long since fallen into disuse 
was that which had held words abusive of a nobleman to be actionable 
when in the case of a common person they would not have been so held.
The trend in English law which in effect was bringing all Englishmen 
under the same legal standard had reached a crucial stage by the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. It is no coincidence, for instance, that in 
1702, the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshal’s Court in cases of scandalous 
words was ended by a ruling of the Court of King's Bench. No longer 
could a man, simply by claiming a certain social status, avail himself 
of that court or the legal standard it observed with respect to words of 
mere abuse.84
The degree to which noblemen accepted this trend away from at 
least one support of their privileged legal status is debatable. William 
Oldnoll Russell, writing in the early nineteenth century, attributed the 
obsolescence of the law of scandalum magnatum to "the nobility preferring 
to waive their privileges in any action of slander, and to stand upon the
82
Francis L. Holt, The Law of Libel, 167; Earl of Sandwich v. 
Miller, Lofft, 210-211, 98 Eng. Rep, 614-615 (1773),
83State (of Missouri) v. Shepherd, 76 Southwestern Reporter, 83
(1903).
^Jennings v. Chambers (1702), cited by G. D. Squibb, The High 
Court of Chivalry (Oxford, 1959), 101-102. The Earl Marshal's Court had 
been revived in the reign of James II.
same footing . . .  as their fellow s u b j e c t s . " ^  Whether the nobility 
actually preferred to waive their privileges is doubtful, their thinking 
having rarely been so egalitarian as to prefer to stand upon the same 
footing with their fellow subjects under any circumstances. The best 
explanation of why the nobility allowed this privilege to fall into dis­
use seems to be simply that by the eighteenth century, it no longer 
satisfactorily served either its social function, as a defense of honor, 
reputation, and status, or its political function as a weapon for stifling 
opposition and silencing criticism.
It may be further argued that noblemen no longer even required 
such a privilege to defend their social and political positions, because 
by the eighteenth century, they were, for the first time since the sixteenth 
century, secure once again in their roles in society. With*the achieve­
ment of political stability by the end of the first quarter of the eight­
eenth c e n t u r y , 86 the "temporary incapacity of the magnates" of which 
Professor Hexter writes, ended, the nobility having at last adapted to 
their new vocation "for commanding solid phalanxes of borough members 
sitting in Parliament . . ."87 Acceptance of this thesis would rightly 
imply that the nobility’s reliance on the law of scandalum magnatum 
during the seventeenth century, however irregular and for whatever reasons, 
was essentially a function of their "temporary incapacity," a consequence 
of the crisis of confidence they experienced, and a sympton of the acute
85William 0. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours,
5th American ed, (Philadelphia, 1845), 238n; cited by Odgers, Libel and 
Slander, 105.
^ S e e  J. H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 
1675-1725 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1973), esp. 9-14, 116, 185-188.
8^Hexter, Reappraisals in History, 148.
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political instability which plagued England continually. Noblemen, 
though still zealous in maintaining their reputations and positions of 
respect, were, by the eighteenth century, secure enough to relinquish 
that special legal protection still offered by the law which was formerly 
so often invoked "that the honour of such great persons may be preserved." 
Whatever the cause, by the nineteenth century, the law of scandalum mag­
natum, out of disuse, had been reduced to little more than the object of 
" c u r i o s i t y , 11^  ancj so joined other legal remnants of the middle ages,
"now in a manner f o r g o t t e n . "89
Giles. Jacob, Law Dictionary (Philadelphia, 1811), VI, 12.
^Henry J. Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws of England (New 
York, 1845), III, 474.
CONCLUSION
Where legal historians of the last century have taken the liberty 
to pronounce historical judgment on the law of scandalum magnatum, it has 
almost always been in the negative. W. Blake Odgers, for one, wrote that 
"such a distinction between nobles and commoners appears to me alien to 
the spirit of our common law."^- He was echoed by Frank Carr who stated 
that the "remedy given by these statutes was foreign to the spirit of the 
English law."2
The urge to denounce the law of scandalum magnatum as undemo­
cratic or contrary to the spirit of a great legal tradition is undeniably 
strong, especially in an age when criticism of those in places of power 
is protected rather than forbidden by the law. Yet to do so would be a 
serious error, for it would be to ignore the conditions that dictated the 
need for such a law in the first place and the standards that determined 
its application in the years following its enactment.
It is essential that the law be viewed in the context of its own 
time, or, more specifically, in the different contexts of the various 
periods of its development. The statutes of scandalum magnatum were 
enacted and first enforced at a time when there was a genuine need to put 
an end to the circulation of "false news or tales," for the safety of the
^Odgers, Libel and Slander, 105,
2
Carr, "The English Law of Defamation," Law Quarterly Review,
18 (1902), 263,
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realm. They came to be applied, centuries later, in harmony with a 
hierarchical concept of society which accorded the nobility a privileged 
status in keeping with what men saw as the natural order of things. The 
same frame of mind which accepted the execution of a dog for barking at
o
a lion as a vindication of the Great Chain of Being, also accepted the 
punishment of a man for speaking disrespectfully of a nobleman. Signif­
icantly, this frame of mind remained embodied in the law long after it 
began to be challenged and even after it had been reduced to little more 
than a reminder of how men once viewed their society.
So it was that as the English nobility experienced their "crisis" 
— first, the gradual loss of their military capacity and later the loss 
of their prestige— they could turn to the statutes of scandalum magnatum 
in defense of their threatened place in society. As has been illustrated, 
in the preceding pages, the first civil actions of scandalum magnatum 
were brought by noblemen at a time when they were being denied their 
former military role by a regime whose success depended in large measure 
on curtailing the power of its nobility, on converting habits of violence 
into habits of non-violence, of which litigation was only one example. 
Likewise, it has been shown that actions of scandalum magnatum increased 
as the nobility suffered the loss of respect and prestige which put them 
in a defensive posture over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries; and as long as they remained on the defensive, they relied on 
the remedy allowed by the statutes. Finally, for a short period, they 
even introduced their legal weapon into the political warfare which denied 
stability to English politics in the second half of the seventeenth
^E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (New York, n.d.),
80-82.
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century. The pattern of development discernable in the evolution of the 
law of scandalum magnatum points to the conclusion that only until the 
nobility recovered their prestige and adapted to new and stable political 
and social roles, did they cease to rely on the statutes of scandalum 
magnatum. That the statutes remained on the books as long as they did, 
was, as Sir Edward Parry has observed, in deference to the maxim "nolumus 
leges Angliae Mutari.
^Edward Parry, The Bloody Assize (London, 1929), 111.
APPENDIX
STATUTES OF SCANDALUM MAGNATUM
A.D. 1275. Anno tertio Edwardi I. Cap. XXIV,
Forasmuch as there have been oftentimes found in the country 
devisors of tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord, hath many 
times arisen between the King and his people, or great men of this 
realm; for the damage that hath and may thereof ensue, it is commanded, 
that from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false 
news or tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander may 
grow between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm; 
and he that doth so, shall be taken and kept in prison, until he hath 
brought him into the court, which was the first author of the tale.
Statutes at Large, I, 53.
A.D. 1378. Anno secundo Richardi II. Stat. 1. Cap. V .
Item, of devisors of false news and of horrible and false 
lyes, of prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other nobles and great 
men of the realm, and also of the Chancellor, Treasurer, Clerk of the 
Privy Seal, Steward of the King’s House, Justices of the one bench or 
of the other, and of other great officers of the realm, of things 
which by the said prelates, lords, nobles, and officers aforesaid, 
were never spoken, done, nor thought, in great slander of the said 
prelates, lords, nobles, and officers, whereby debates and discords 
might arise betwixt the said lords, or between the lords and the com­
mons (which God forbid) and whereof great peril and mischief might 
come to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the 
said realm, if due remedy be not provided: It is straitly defended
upon grievous pain, for to eschew the said damages and perils, that 
from henceforth none be so hardy to devise, speak, or to tell any 
false news, lyes, or other such false things, of prelates, lords, and 
of other aforesaid, whereof discord or any slander might rise within 
the same realm; and he that doth the same shall incur and have the 
pain another time ordained thereof by the Statute of Westminster the 
First, which will, that he be taken and imprisoned till he have found 
him of whom the word was moved.
Statutes at Large, I, 343-343.
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A.D. 1388. Anno duodecimo Richard II, Cap. XI
Item, whereas it is contained, as well in the Statute of West­
minster the first, as in the Statute made at Gloucester, the second 
year of the reign of our Lord the King that now is, that none be so 
hardy to invent, to say, or to tell any false news, lies, or such other 
false things, of the prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other nobles 
and great men of the realm, and also of the Chancellor, Treasurer, Clerk 
of the Privy Seal, the Steward of the King’s House, the Justice of the 
one bench or of the other, and other great officers of the realm, and 
he that doth so shall be taken and imprisoned, till he hath found him 
of whom the speech shall be moved: it is accorded and agreed in this
Parliament, that when any such is taken and imprisoned, and cannot find 
him by whom the speech be moved as before is said, that he be punished 
by the advice of the council, notwithstanding the said statutes.
Statutes at Large, I, 381.
A.D. 1554. Anno primo & secundo Philippi & Mariae. Cap. III.
A confirmation of the Stat. of 3 Ed. 1. c. 34. and 2 R. 2. Stat.
1. c. 5. touching telling of news. Justices of Peace in every shire, 
city, &c. shall have authority to hear and determine the said offences, 
and to put the said two statutes in execution. If any person shall be 
convicted or attainted for speaking maliciously of his own imagination, 
any false, seditious and slanderous news, saying, or tales, of the King 
or Queen, then he shall for his first offence be set on the pillory in 
some market-place near where the words were spoken, and have both his 
ears cut off, unless he pay to the Queen an hundred pound within_xme 
month after judgment given, and also shall be three months imprisoned: 
and if he shall speak any such slanderous and seditious news or tales of
the speaking or report of any other, then he shall be set on the pillory
and have one of his ears cut off, unless he pay an hundred marks to the 
Queen’s use within one month after, and shall be one month imprisoned: 
and if he shall do it by book, rhime, ballad, letter or writing, he shall 
have his right hand stricken off. And if any person being once convicted 
of any of the offences aforesaid, do afterward offend, he shall be 
imprisoned during his life, and forfeit all his good and chattels.
Statutes at Large, II, 469.
LAW REPORT ABBREVIATIONS
The abbreviations listed on the following pages are those used 
in standard legal citation. They refer to specific reports, which, as 
a rule, were first published under the name of the author or editor, 
but which were later compiled in The English Reports (see the biblio­
graphical essay, pages 96 and 97). This list is simply to identify the 
original edition of each report cited in the footnotes to this paper.
As an example, a footnote written according to the standard 
method of legal citation would read as follows:
■^Earl of Shaftesbury v. Cradock, 1 Ventris 363, 86 Eng.
Rep. 234 (1682).
This reference is to the case of the Earl of Shaftesbury against Cradock, 
reported on page 363 of Part I of Ventris’s Reports, reprinted on page
234 of Volume 86 of The English Reports. The date of the case is usually
given in the original report by term (Hilary, Easter, Trinity, or Michael­
mas) and by regnal year; the date of the example cited above is given in 
the report as "Terming Paschae, Anno 34 Car. II in Banco Regis;" that is, 
Easter term (April 15 through May 8), 1682, in the Court of King’s Bench. 
It should be noted in this instance that the reign of Charles II was dated 
from the year of his father’s death (1649), though he was in exile until 
1660.
For each report, the place of publication is London. The number
of the volume of The English Reports in which the report is reprinted is
given in parenthesis.
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John Holt from 1688 to 1710 during the time he 
was Lord Chief Justice of England, 1738 (90 Eng. 
Rep.).
William Jones, Les Reports de Sir William Jones . . .
en le darreign Temps delr Reign de Roy Jaques, 
come en l'anns de Roy Charles I, 1675 (82 Eng.
Rep.).
Joseph Keble, Reports in the Court of King’s Bench at
Westminster, from the xii to the xxx year of the 
Reign of . . . King Charles II, 1685 (83 Eng.
Rep.).
Robert Keilwey, Reports d'aseuns Cases . . . aux temps
du Roy Henry le Septieme . . .  & Henry le
Huitiesme, 1688 (72 Eng. Rep.).
William Leonard, Reports and Cases of Law Argued and 
Adjudged in the Courts at Westminster in the 
times of the late Queen Elizabeth and King James, 
1687 (74 Eng. Rep.).
Creswell Levinz, The Reports of Sir Creswell Levinz,
Knt. . . . Containing cases heard and determined
during the time that Sir Matthew Hale, Sir 
Richard Rainsfora, and Sir William Scroggs were 
Chief Justices, trans. Mr. Serjeant Salkeld,
3d ed., 1793 (83 Eng. Rep.).
James Ley (Earl of Marlborough), Reports of Divers
Resolutions in Law arising upon Cases . . .  in 
the reigns of the Late Kings, King James and 
King Charles, 1659 (80 Eng. Rep.).
Capel Lofft, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of 
King's Bench from . . .  12 Geo. Ill to . . ♦ 14 
Geo. Ill, 1790 (98 Eng. Rep.).
Modern Reports; or, Select Cases Adjudged in the Courts 
of King's Bench, Chancery, Common Pleas, and 
Exchequer from the Restoration of Charles the 
Second to the twenty-eighth year of George the 
Second, 5th ed., edited by Thomas Leach, 1796 
(86, 87, and 88 Eng. Rep.).
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Francis Moore, Cases Collect and Report per Sir. Fra.
Moore, Chevalier, Serjeant del Ley, 2d ed., 1688 
(72 Eng. Rep.).
Jeffery Palmer, The Reports of Sir Jeffery Palmer . . .
Attorney General to . . . Charles the Second, 2d 
ed., 1721 (81 Eng. Rep.).
John Popham, Reports and Cases Collected by Sir John
Popham, Kt., Late Lord Chief Justice of England, 
enl., 1682 (79 Eng. Rep.).
William Salkeld, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court 
of King’s Bench . . . from the First year of 
King William and Queen Mary, to the Tenth Year 
of Queen Anne, 1795 (91 Eng. Rep.).
Thomas Siderfin, Les Reports des divers Special Cases
Argue and Adjudge en le Court del Bank le Roy . . . 
en les primier dix and apres le Restuaration de 
. . . Charles le II., 2 ed., 1714 (82 Eng. Rep.).
Bartholomew Shower, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the 
Court of King's Bench, during the reigns of 
Charles the Second, James the Second, and William 
the Third, 2d ed., corrected by Thomas Leach,
1794 (89 Eng. Rep.).
Robert Skinner, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court 
of King’s Bench from the Thirty-third year of 
King Charles the Second to the Ninth Year of King 
William the Third, 1728 (90 Eng. Rep.).
John Strange, Reports of Adjudged Cases in the Courts of 
Chancery, King's Bench, Common Pleas, and 
Exchequer, from . . . the Second Year of King
George I to . . . the Twenty-first Year of King
George II, 3d ed., enl. by Michael Nolan, 1795 
(93 Eng. Rep.).
Ventris Peyton Ventris, The Reports of Sir Peyton Ventris, Kt., 
4th ed., corrected, 1726 (86 Eng. Rep.).
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
Legal Sources
A large number of the sources consulted in preparation for this 
paper and cited in the footnotes are best classified simply as "legal 
sources," rather than the customary "primary" or "secondary" sources.
This is done in view of the fact that while many legal materials were 
published contemporaneously with the events being described, they were 
not necessarily first-hand accounts nor were they original statements 
of legal principles. The difficulty encountered in tracing the origin 
of a particular citation or point of law is well known to those who have 
worked with legal sources dating from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries, a time when legal writers did not always feel 
obliged to identify the original source of their information.
Statutes: All statutory citations, with the exception of the
Statute Law Revision Act of 1887, are to the first two volumes of The 
Statutes at Large (45 vols., London, 1763-1866). The Statute Law Revision 
Act is found in The Law Reports. The Public General Statutes, Passed in 
. . . the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria (28 vols., London, 1866-1900).
Law Reports: Probably the most valuable legal sources are the
law reports, which provide records of trials and judicial decisions.
The largest single published collection of law reports is The English 
Reports (176 vols., Edinburgh and London, 1900-1930). Most of the
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reports collected in these .volumes for the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries are simply reprints of the notes made during 
judicial proceedings by judges and lawyers for their own personal use. 
There was no official court reporting until 1865, and, as a rule, these 
early reports were never intended for publication, hence they tend to 
be jumbled, unsystematic and often positively unintelligible. Though 
unreliable in many instances, they can be extremely valuable when veri­
fied by other sources . In this paper, every effort has been made to 
cite reports in pairs where two (or more) accounts of the same case 
survive and to verify them with other sources where possible. For 
bibliographical information on each report cited in the footnotes of 
this paper, see pages 92—95.
Another major source of legal records is T. B. Howell, ed., 
Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High 
Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors (33 vols., London, 1809-1826). 
The material included in these volumes is gathered from a large variety 
of legal and non-legal sources, sometimes appearing in published form 
for the first time. Extensive notes are provided to supplement the 
legal records.
Smaller collections of law reports have also been published, 
most notably by the Selden Society. Local court records dating from the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are found in F. W. Maitland, ed., 
Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial Courts (Selden Society, 
Vol. 2, London, 1889), and in F. W. Maitland and W, P. Baildon, eds,,
The Court Baron (Selden Society, Vol. 4, London, 1891). Records of the 
Court of King’s Bench dating from the late thirteenth century to the 
fifteenth century are found in G. 0. Sayles, ed., Select Cases in the
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Court of King's Bench Under Edward I, Vol. I (Selden Society, Vol. 55, 
London, 1936); Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench Under Edward 
III (Selden Society, Vol. 82, London, 1965); and Select Cases in the 
Court of King’s Bench Under Richard II, Henry IV and Henry V (Selden 
Society, Vol. 88, London, 1971).
Reports of cases brought in the Star Chamber include I. S. Leadam, 
ed., Select Cases Before the Kingfs Council in the Star Chamber, Commonly 
Called the Court of Star Chamber, A.D. 1477-1509 (Selden Society, Vol.
16., London, 1903), described by G. R. Elton, however, as being "so riddled 
with misinterpretations and outright mistakes, that his valuable work 
can be used only with the utmost care."^ A more reliable collection of 
Star Chamber reports is John Hawarde., Les Reportes del Cases in Camera 
Stellata, 1593 to 1609, ed. W. P. Baildon (London, 1894); this volume 
proved to be the most valuable collection of Star Chamber cases used in 
this investigation. Most of the cases date from the period when Sir 
Edward Coke was Attorney General and they include a large number of 
interesting cases for "sclaunderous words" against noblemen. The edition, 
privately printed in 1894, is carefully edited, providing identification 
of most of the names which appear in the text and necessary background 
information about the cases reported. Another collection of Star Chamber 
reports, though less useful than Hawarde, is Samuel R. Gardiner, ed., 
Reports of Cases in the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission 
(Camden Society, n.s., Vol. 39, London, 1886); the cases reported in this 
slim volume date only from the years 1631 and 1632, though according to 
Davies, they illustrate the "ordinary course of business in these courts.
^Elton, ed., Tudor Constitution, 158n.
^Godfrey Davies, ed., Bibliography of British History, Stuart 
Period (Oxford, 1928), 106.
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Commentaries, etc.: Another category of legal sources are the
innumerable commentaries, abridgments,, digests, treatises and dictionaries 
which were published with the intent of rendering the laws of England 
intelligible in a relatively concise form, though some of them fall short 
of this goal. Many of these works are quite well-known, such as Henry 
de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. George E. Woodbine, 
trans. Samuel E. Thorne (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), reputed to be the 
earliest comprehensive treatise on English law (written c. 1250-1260); 
Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (London, 1797), of which 
the second part (first published in 1642) and the third part (first 
published in 1644) proved most useful for the purposes of this paper; 
and William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 vols., 
Oxford, 1765-1769; reprint ed., London, 1966). Later editions of Black- 
stone, with notes and additions, also proved useful, such as that edited 
by Edward Christian (Boston, 1818). A number of commentaries have been 
based on Blackstone, such as Henry J. Stephen, New Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (4 vols., New York, 1845).
Perhaps less well-known but as valuable as the commentaries 
listed above is Richard Crompton, L ’authoritie et jurisdiction des 
Courts de la Malestie de la Roygrie (London, 1637). First published in 
1594, this work became a standard source for seventeenth-century legal 
writers; it is written in law-French and contains the earliest available 
published account of the Duke of Buckingham’s action of scandalum magnatum 
(1512), as well as accounts of a number of undated cases. Based on this 
book is Crompton, Star-Chamber Cases. Shewing What Causes Properly 
Belong to the Cognizance of that Court (London, 1630; reprint ed., Boston, 
1881). Another useful work on the Star Chamber is William Hudson, A.
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Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber, ed. F. Hargrave, in Collectanea 
Juridica (2 vols., London, 1792), II, 1-240. Written around 1620, this 
work is a lengthy commentary on the Star Chamber, though with a mere 
five pages devoted to "Libelling and Scandalous words against Nobles." 
Hudson was particularly concerned with "libels which touch the alteration 
of government."
Later legal commentaries include Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment 
of the Law (8 vols., Philadelphia, 1856), a work which was originally - 
published from 1736 to 1766; it is based on William Sheppard, Grand 
Abridgment (London, 1675),^ Volume VIII of Bacon’s Abridgment includes 
seven pages on scandalum magnatum with numerous notes and references.
John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England (8 vols., New York, 1824), 
which was originally published from 1762 to 1767, also contains a useful 
account of the statutes of scandalum magnaturn and a listing of many of 
the cases brought on the statutes, giving the words which were held 
actionable in each case. As with many such digests, however, dating and ' 
chronology were for the most part ignored.
A number of legal dictionaries are available to provide definitions 
for legal terms which would have been accepted at a given period. The 
earliest dictionary consulted in the research for this paper was Thomas 
Blount, A Law Dictionary (London, 1670, 1691); also consulted were John 
Cowell, The Interpreter of Words and Terms Used Either in the Common or 
Statute Laws of This Realm (London, 1701); Giles Jacob, The Law Dictionary: 
Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the English Law (6 
vols., Philadelphia, 1811); and Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary
3Clyde L. Grose, ed., A Select Bibliography of British History, 
1660-1760 (New York, 1967), 41.
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(St. Paul, Minn., 1910).
A final category of legal sources consulted for this paper 
consists of those books devoted specifically to the law of defamation 
"The first formal treatise on the common law of defamation,*’ according 
to Professor W. R. Jones,^ was John March, Actions for Slaunder; or, A 
Methodicall Collection Under Certain Grounds and Heads, of What Words Are 
Actionable in the Law and What Are Not? (London, 1647). March wrote his 
treatise "to deterre men from words, which are but winde . . . which 
subject men to actions in which damages and costs are to be recovered, 
which usually trench to the great hindrance and impoverishment of the 
speakers." Apparently patterned after March's work was William Sheppard, 
Action Upon the Case for Slander. Or A Methodical Collection under 
certain Heads, of Thousands of Cases Dispersed in the many Great Volumes 
of the Law, of what words are Actionable, and what not . . . (London, 
1662). More recent treatises on the law of defamation include Francis L. 
Holt, The Law of Libel: In which Is Contained a General History of This
Law in the Ancient Codes, and of Its Introduction and Successive Altera­
tions 5.n the Law of England (London, 1816); Thomas Starkie, A Treatise 
on the. Law of.Slander., Libel, Scandalum Magnatum, and False Rumours, 1st 
American ed. (New York, 1826); and W. Blake Odgers, Libel and Slander 
(Philadelphia, 1887).
General legal histories, biographical studies of legal figures, 
articles from law journals, and other more recent legal writings are 
included below under "secondary sources."
4
W. R. Jones, "’Actions for Slaunder'— Defamation in English Law, 
Language, and History," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (1971), 279.
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Other Primary Sources
Parliamentary Sources: Many of the standard Parliamentary
sources were consulted in preparation for this paper. CobbettTs Parl­
iamentary History of England from the Norman Conquest in 1066 to the 
Year 1803 (36 vols., London, 1806-1820) proved useful for the account 
it provided of the enactment of the 1378 Statute of Gloucester. The 
journals of both the House of Lords and the House of Commons provided 
the bulk of the Parliamentary material cited in the footnotes regarding 
complaints of the Lords for allegedly "scandalous" words, attempts to 
repeal the statutes of scandalum magnatum, and attempts to reverse the 
judgments in cases of scandalum magnatum. Likewise, Anchitell Grey, 
Debates of the House of Commons, 1667-1694 (10 vols., London, 1763) 
was of some value in its account of the debate in 1680 over the bill 
"for the better regulating the Tryal of the Peers of England," in which 
an attempt to repeal the statutes was involved. The Historical Man­
uscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of the House of Lords (4 vols., 
London, 1887-1894), and the new series of The Manuscripts of the House 
of Lords (11 vols., London, 1900-1962), published in continuation of 
the volumes issued under the authority of the Historical Manuscripts 
Commission, provided some useful references concerning attempts to 
reverse judgments.
Government record and manuscript publications: The calendars of
state papers and manuscript collections published by the Public Record 
Office and the Historical Manuscripts Commission contain a large amount 
of useful material. The volumes of the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 
Series covering the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth and James I 
(12 v o l s L o n d o n ,  1856-1872; reprint ed., Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967);
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of Charles I (23 vols., London, 1856-1872; reprint ed., Nendeln, Liechten­
stein, 1967); and of Charles II (28 Vols., London, 1860-1947; reprint ed., 
Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1968) provided many valuable illustrations of 
government concern for words reflecting on the "great men of the realm," 
and for the legal proceedings arising from them. The manuscript collec­
tions published or calendared by the Historical Manuscripts Commission 
were also of great value, especially the Calendar of the Manuscripts of 
the Marquess of Ormonde (15th Report, n.s., 8 vols., London, 1902- 
1920); the Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of 
Salisbury (9th Report, 19 vols., London, 1889-1965); The Manuscripts of 
His Grace the Duke of Northumberland (3rd Report, London, 1872); and The 
Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland (13th, 14th and 15th 
Reports, 10 vols., London, 1892-1931).
Memoirs, diaries, papers, letters, etc.: Publications of personal
observations and recollections, whether in memoir, diary or simply letter 
form, were among the most valuable sources employed in the writing of 
this paper. Covering the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods are J. Payne 
Collier, ed., The Egerton Papers. A Collection of Public and Private 
Documents Chiefly Illustrative of the Times of Elizabeth and James I 
(Camden Society, o.s., Vol. 12, London, 1840); John Harington, Nugae 
Antiquae; Being a Miscellaneous Collection of Original Papers in Prose 
and Verse, Written During the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Queen 
Mary, Elizabeth, and King James (2 vols., London, 1804); Edmund Lodge, 
Illustrations of British History, Biography and Manners in the Reigns of 
Henry VIII, Mary, Elizabeth, and James I . . . Original Papers, Selected 
from the Manuscripts of the Noble Families of Howard, Talbot and Cecil 
(3 vols., London, 1791); Henry Machyn, The Diary of Henry Machyn, 1550- 
1563, ed. John G. Nichols (Camden Society, o.s., Vol. 42, London, 1848;
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reprint ed., New York, 1968); and John Manningham, Diary of John Manning­
ham, of the Middle Temple . . .Barrister at Law, 1602-1603 (Camden Society, 
o.s., Vol. 99, London, 1868). Spanning the seventeenth century, and 
particularly useful for the late 1670fs, is Edward M. Thompson, ed., Correspon­
dence of the Family of Hatton (2 vols., Camden Sbciety, n.s., Vols. 22- 
23, London, 1878-1879).
A number of more well-known memoirs dating from the later seven­
teenth century were also of great value, most notably Edward Hyde, The 
Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon (3 vols., Oxford, 1827); Gilbert Burnet,
Bishop Burnet’s History of His Own Time (6 vols., Oxford, 1823); and 
Narcissus Luttrell, A Brief Relation of State Affairs (6 vols., Oxford,
1857). Of particular importance for the decade 1680 to 1690 is the last 
named work, Luttrellfs Brief Relation, a chronicle of contemporary events 
which remained in manuscript form until the nineteenth century when Lord 
Macaulay’s reliance on it as a source for his History of England brought 
about its hurried publication in six poorly indexed volumes (without 
preface or notes).Luttrell extracted the entires in his Brief Relation 
from newsletters and newspapers, and, though not always accurate, the 
work is "valuable as a guide to what the public of the day knew."^
General works: A large number of primary sources, especially the 
collected works of one author or treatises on various subjects, are best 
classified simply as "general works," a designation intended to prevent 
unnecessary bibliographical confusion as to the nature of the works.
Containing several different valuable works is Francis Bacon, The Works 
of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (14
^Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Luttrell, Narcissus.”
Davies, ed., Bibliography, 42.
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vols., London, 1870-1874; reprint ed., New York, 1968). Included in 
these volumes are Bacon’s Proposition for the Suppression of Duels (1613); 
The Charge of Sir Francis Bacon, Knight, his Majesties Attourney General, 
touching Duells . . . (1614); his Notes of the Lord Darcy’s Case of Duells 
against Mr. Gervice Markham (1616); his Historie of the Raigne of King 
Henry the Seventh (1622); and his Maxims of the Law (1630). Likewise,
Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed.
William Molesworth (11 vols., London, 1839-1845) includes Leviathan (1651) 
and The Philosophical Elements of a True Citizen, both of which provided 
useful commentary on seventeenth-century attitudes towards honor and 
duelling.
Of the numerous treatises consulted in preparation for this paper, 
the most valuable were: John Brydall, Privilegia Magnatum apud Anglos: 
or, a Declaration of the Divers and Sundry Preheminencies, or Privileges, 
Allowed by the Laws and Customs of England, unto the first-born among 
Her Majesty’s Subjects, The Temporal Lords of Parliament (London, 1704; 
microfilm reprint, New Haven, Conn., 1974), a treatise which seems to be 
based on parts of Edward Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia: or, the Present
State of England Compleat. Together with Divers Reflections upon the 
Ancient State thereof, 17th ed. (London, 1692), an annual publication 
which first appeared in 1669, and which includes an indispensable enumera­
tion of the privileges of the peerage; and The Laws of Honour: or. a
Compendious Account of the Ancient Derivation of All Titles, Dignities, 
Offices, &c. as well Spiritual as Temporal, Civil or Military. Shewing 
the Prerogative of the Crown, Privileges of Peerage, and of Parliament . . . 
(London, 1714), a work which includes an interesting discussion of 
"Injuries done to the Name and Honour of a Nobleman."
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Edmund Hickeringill, The Ceremony Monger, His Character (London, 
1689; microfilm reprint, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970) contains remarks ’'upon 
the New Star Chamber, or a late course of the Court of King’s Bench, of 
the Nature of a Libel and Scandalum Magnatum." Scandalum Magnatum: or
Potapski’s Case. A Satyr Against Polish Oppression (London, 1682) is a 
satire in verse by an anonymous Tory poet, possibly Thomas D ’Urfey,^ on 
the Earl of Shaftesbury, "occasioned by his action of scandalum magnatum 
against Cradock and Graham." Scandalum Magnatum; or the Great Trial at 
Chelmnesford Assizes (London, 1682) is a detailed account of the action 
brought by Henry Compton, Bishop of London, against Edmund Hickeringill.
It is biased in favor of the defendant and contains a number of satirical 
observations on the nature of the proceedings.
Edited documents collections: A final category of primary sources
consists of the many edited documents collections, of which the following 
proved most valuable for their commentary as well as their presentation 
of useful documents: Stephen B. Baxter, ed., Basic Documents of English
History (Boston, 1968); G. R. Elton, ed., The Tudor Constitution: Doc­
uments and Commentary (Cambridge, 1962); P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larkin, 
eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations (3 vols., New Haven, Conn., 1964); J. P. 
Kenyon, ed., The Stuart Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge,
1966); and John F. Naylor, ed., The British Aristocracy and the Peerage 
Bill of 1719 (New York, 1968).
According to the Folger Shakespeare Library general catalogue, 
this work is sometimes attributed to D ’Urfey. It is not included, 
however, in the collection of Poems on State Affairs: Augustan Satirical
Verse, 1660-1714, ed. George de F. Lord (New Haven, Conn., 1963).
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Secondary Sources
Those books and articles which are the products of research done 
over the last hundred years or so comprise the final category of sources 
consulted in preparation for this paper. The label "secondary sources':' 
applies both to legal and non-legal works.
General legal and constitutional secondary sources: Long con­
sidered the most complete and definitive history of English law is 
William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (13 vols., Boston, 1922).
By far the most useful legal history for the purposes of this paper, how­
ever, was T. F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 2d ed., 
enl. (Rochester, N. Y., 1936). Of some additional value were James F. 
Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (3 vols., London, 1883); 
Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law (Baltimore, 1966); and 
S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London, 1969).
A good survey is available in Colin R. Lovell, English Constitutional 
and Legal History (New York, 1962).
Defamation: Though no definitive historical study of the English
law of defamation has appeared in book form, a number of valuable articles 
have been written on the subject. They include Frank Carr, "The English 
Law of Defamation," Law Quarterly Review, 18 (1902), 255-273; 388-399;
Van Vechten Veeder, "The History of the Law of Defamation," in Select 
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Boston, 1909); W. S. Holdsworth, 
"Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Law Quarterly 
Review, 40 (1924), 302-315; 397-412; 41 (1925), 13-31; and W. R. Jones, 
"’Actions for Slaunder'— Defamation in English Law, Language, and History," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (1971), 274-283.
Medieval Studies: A number of the books consulted, especially
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in preparation for Chapter I of this paper, were those dealing with 
various aspects of the middle ages, particularly the legal aspects. An 
important work for understanding the limited jurisdiction of medieval 
courts is F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The History of English Law Before 
the Time of Edward I, (2 vols., Cambridge, 1911). J. G. Bellamy, The Law 
of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1970) is 
useful for its discussion of the concept of treason for words. An ima­
ginative, though apparently well researched account of the governmental 
motivations behind the enactment of the statutes of scandalum magnatum is 
in J. J. Jusserand, English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages, trans.
L. T. Smith (New York, 1929). For a good survey of medieval constitu­
tional foundations, see Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional History of Medieval 
England (New York, 1960).
Tudor-Stuart studies: The majority of the non-legal secondary
sources consulted for this paper were books and articles dealing with 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, most of them focusing on 
political and social developments of the period. Many valuable facts 
and ideas were contributed by Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristoc­
racy, 1558-1643, (Oxford, 1965), a carefully documented account of the 
loss of power and prestige suffered by the English aristocracy in the 
century preceding the outbreak of the Civil War. This book was reviewed 
in J. H. Hexter, "The English Aristocracy, Its Crises," Journal of 
British Studies, 7 (1968), 22-78, an article which also contributed to 
some of the ideas presented in this paper. More commentary on the 
social position of the aristocracy is found in J. H. Hexter, "Storm Over 
the Gentry," in Reappraisals in History: New Views on History and
Society (New York, 1961). G. P. Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant (Cambridge,
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Mass., 1962) provides a useful analysis of the social forces at work 
behind the concept of honor and the practice of duelling in the early 
seventeenth century.
Particularly valuable for anyone engaged in seventeenth-century 
legal studies is G. D. Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry (Oxford, 1959), 
a history of the Earl Marshal's Court which provides a look at proceedings 
in cases of "scandalous words provocative of a duel." For the later 
Stuart period, much can be learned from A. F. Havighurst, "The Judiciary 
and Politics in the Reign of Charles II," Law Quarterly Review, 66 
(1950), 62, 229; and A. L. Cross, "The English Law Courts at the Close 
of the Revolution of 1688," Michigan Law Review, 15 (1917), 529-551.
For the political developments of the later Stuart period which so 
strongly influenced the nature of the legal proceedings under discussion 
in this paper, J. R. Jones, The First Whigs (London, 1961) proved to be 
the most useful for its account, of the politics of the Exclusion crisis.
An important study of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
political trends, and the source of some of the ideas presented in the 
concluding pages of this paper, is J. K. Plumb, The Growth of Political 
Stability in England, 1675-1725 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1973).
The House of Lords: The House of Lords, which figures prominently
in any study of the English nobility, has been the subject of several 
books and articles. L. 0. Pike, A Constitutional History of the House 
of Lords (London, 1894) is a useful survey. More recent and more 
limited in scope is M. P. Schoenfeld, The Restored House of Lords (The 
Hague, 1967), a detailed analysis of the House of Lords in 1660, including 
a concise enumeration of the legal privileges of the peerage (including 
scandalum magnatum). Perhaps the definitive study of the House of Lords
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is the work of A. S. Turberville, "The House of Lords Under Charles II," 
English Historical Review, 44 (1929), 400-417, 45 (1930), 58-77; The 
House of Lords in the Reign of William III (Oxford, 1913; reprint ed., 
Westport, Conn., 1970); and The House of Lords in the XVIIIth Century 
(Oxford, 1927; reprint ed., Westport, Conn., 1970). Turberville's 
achievement in the two books just listed is summarized and discussed in 
W. S. Holdsworth, "The House of Lords, 1689-1783," Law Quarterly Review,
45 (1929), 307-342; 432-458.
Biographies: A final category of secondary sources consists of
biographical studies. Of course, The Dictionary of National Biography 
(63 vols., London, 1885-1900) is indispensable, as is G. E. Cokayne, The 
Complete Peerage, new ed., rev. (13 vols., London, 1910-1959). Biograph­
ical sketches of judicial figures are found in Edward Foss, The Judges 
of England (9 vols,, London, 1864). Individual biographies of judges 
include Catherine D. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times
of Sir Edward Coke (Boston, 1956), a popularized, romanticized presenta­
tion of the man often considered to have been England's greatest judge; and 
G„ W. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart Cause (London, 1965), 
an extremely sympathetic view of the man often considered to have been 
England's worst judge. To conclude, two biographies of the first Earl of 
Shaftesbury are worth citing: W. D. Christie, A Life of Anthony Ashley
Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury (2 vols., London, 1871), useful for its 
publication of some of Shaftesbury's letters and those of his associates; 
and K. H. D. Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), a lengthy, 
sympathetic treatment of Shaftesbury and his role in the politics of the 
day.
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